By William Tucker
Just over a year ago I wrote an article for In Homeland Security entitled “Washington’s Challenge in the Great Game.” The focus of the article was on the slew of challenges that were hitting the occupant of the Oval Office and how Presidents either succeed or fail to manage these issues. In many ways the President doesn’t get to set the agenda. Instead, the President must pick and choose which crisis to deal with and which one to put off for another day. Many times a crisis will recede as fast as it appeared on the scene without intervention, but then there are those crises that must faced with the full power available to the White House. In this case the use of the term ‘full power’ is not restricted to the trappings of the U.S. constitution; rather it entails every element of national power and political capital the President can bring to bear. A good President can address problems as they come; a great President can use the crisis as a tool.
In the past year the challenge’s that Washington faces have not decreased in number, scope or difficulty. Indeed the Arab unrest, Iran’s march toward a nuclear capability and China’s aggressive approach in the Pacific must be confronted and ultimately headed off. The U.S. has done this before. In pursuing its national security interests, the U.S. follows two complementary tracts – keep Eurasian competitors locked down on the Eurasian landmass and control the world’s oceans to prevent any competitor from encroaching on the Western Hemisphere. Of course, this description is painted with the broadest strokes possible, but they will suffice for this article. The U.S. has used this approach since it gained independence over two hundred years ago, and the approach, while often seen as contradictory, has worked well.
The U.S. has succeeded in controlling the world’s oceans. In fact, there’s not a single peer competitor that comes close to the prowess of the U.S. Navy. Thus the challenge remains to prevent a regional power from becoming a global competitor, or more specifically, maintaining a balance on the Eurasian landmass. The pursuit of this balance can be accomplished by sowing chaos or using regional allies as a military counterbalance to emerging regional powers. An example of chaos was the Iran-Iraq war in which the U.S. covertly worked to prolong the conflict, while the backing of South Korea and Japan against China’s rise describes the latter approach. The second approach requires the most maintenance. The U.S. only wants to support its allies so much lest they become too powerful. This is why China has been so aggressive. The second piece to the military balance approach includes a strong U.S. military presence; one that has been lacking in the region over the last decade.
Over the course of U.S. history allies have become enemies and enemies have become allies. The U.S., under Thomas Jefferson, tried its hand at regime change on the Barbary Coast by supporting an indigenous force with a minimal U.S. military force. During the Cold War, Washington allied with an Islamist government in Pakistan against a democratic India because it fit the need at the time. Today, the U.S. is involved in Libya because allied powers in the region couldn’t handle the burden alone. The U.S. has refrained from using military power in Yemen and Syria because Saudi Arabia and Turkey are more than capable of handling these situations in their own backyard. The seeming contradiction between the U.S. as a moral force and the U.S. as a global power appear profound, however morality is not limited solely to philosophy. Sometimes it is found in pragmatism. And so the U.S. will emerge from the War on Terror as we’ve come to know it over the past decade by returning to a more familiar role in global affairs. This approach will continue to work so long as the President, whoever that may, exercises the wisdom necessary in dealing with global crises and leveraging the weight of U.S. power accordingly.
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