By William Tucker
Chief Correspondent for In Homeland Security
The crisis between Ukraine and Russia revolving around Crimean independence has naturally drawn in the U.S., the EU, and NATO. European nations that were once part of the Eastern Bloc of the Soviet Union are understandably nervous given the lack of response from the Western powers to the Russian incursion in Georgia, the unseating of the Kyrgyz government in 2010, and this most recent move to annex Crimea. Under the banner of NATO, the U.S. has moved military assets, albeit menial, to Poland and has followed through with military exercises in the Black Sea and Ukraine proper as a way to assuage the fears of the former Soviet states. Washington has even levied sanctions against several Russian entities, though the effigy of such a move is questionable. Western and Russian media have even taken up the familiar Cold War mantle of tit for tat accusations of peddling propaganda and obfuscating the actual issues. Overlooked in the Western media, though perhaps not so much in Russia, is the Turkish interest in Crimea, or more accurately, the interest in the Crimean Tartars living on the peninsula. As the protests in Kiev boiled over in late February and early March, Turkey was naturally paying close attention to the events as evidenced by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to the Ukrainian capital in early march. In the days following that visit, Davutoglu stated, “A power may attempt to turn the Crimea issue into first a Tatar-Russian and subsequently a Turkish-Russian crisis. We will not let this happen.”
How Turkey would prevent this “Turkish-Russian crisis” is unknown, but Ankara would follow through with a preplanned naval tour of several African nations rather than scrapping those plans and keeping its forces closer to home. It would seem that Turkey is either content with its domestic force structure in the face of this crisis and doesn’t expect it to escalate, or Ankara was sending a message to Moscow stating that it had no intention of allowing the crisis to escalate to a military standoff. The recent remark from Davutoglu that “We stand together with the EU and NATO on Crimea” seems to contradict earlier pledges of diplomacy over military means to resolve this crisis, however. The Foreign Minister must assume that the EU and NATO have no intention of watching this issues escalate to the military level, either; however this crisis is far from over and provocations can easily lead to more provocative maneuvers from the belligerents. It is possible that the pledges of diplomacy are meant to assure the parties involved that the Ukrainian ambassador in Ankara, Sergiy Korsunsky, appeal to Turkey to “provide political, economic and, if necessary, military assistance” would be taken with a grain of salt. Ukraine’s request is understandable given the amount of Russian forces aligned on its borders, but there is a card Kiev may try to play if Russia actively targets Tartars. Davutoglu stated Wednesday that, “we would like Crimean Tatars to see us as the guarantor for their presence there, and we will act in accordance with this view.” If Turkey is really prepared to be the “guarantor” of Tatar security in Crimea, then they must have, at the very least, considered that military action was entirely in the realm of possibilities. Certainly, Ukraine was alluding to that claim and expects Turkey to follow through. Russian President Vladimir Putin did claim in his recent speech to the Duma that the rights of the Crimean Tartars would be recognized, but Putin has walked through several post-Soviet treaties in the name of protecting Russians abroad making his statement dubious at best.
Crimea was once part of the Ottoman Empire, and as the Ottoman’s successor state, Turkey views Crimea as a strategic benefit if the peninsula were under Ankara’s rule; however should Crimea ever return to Russian hands, then it becomes a significant liability. Were Crimea to remain in Ukraine’s hands, Turkey would likely feel more comfortable with the arrangement. It is no mistake that the Ottoman and Russian Empire’s fought 17 wars in and around the Black Sea with much of the attention on Crimea. The Ottoman’s would eventually lose Crimea in 1783 in a treaty signed with Catherine the Great leaving he territory in Russian hands right up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Contained within the treaty was the stipulation that should Crimea ever be declared an independent state, then the territory would default back to Turkish dominion. The question of Crimea’s status was raised once again following the post-Soviet negotiations, however Turkey did not make a formal claim on the territory with the Turgut Ozal administration simply claiming to be an advocate for the rights of the Tartars already living in Crimea and the right of return for those deported under Soviet rule. This position, however, has become nearly as delicate as making a formal claim for ownership of Crimea. As previously stated, Putin has held little regard for international treaties – even those agreed upon by his nation – and the proclamation that he is willing to protect Tartar rights holds little water. In fact, one prominent Tartar dissident has already been tortured to death. Should this incident evolve into something more widespread, then Turkey will have little choice but to get involved in some fashion with diplomacy as the first resort.
Turkey finds itself in the position of having Russian influence spreading on its periphery around the Black Sea, down through the Caucasus to Armenia, in its southern reaches bordering Syria, and also with Russian support for Iranian designs throughout the Levant. A similar situation forced Turkey to join a nascent NATO when the treaty was first drafted to protect itself from Soviet encroachment. Given this, it appears the Turks understand the dangers of allowing Moscow free reign over Turkey’s borderlands and it would be natural that Ankara would begin to respond in some way, however attempts at engaging in a more internationalist foreign policy – especially in Turkey’s near abroad – have not yet begun to bear fruit. Ankara had a very real chance at displaying leadership on the Syrian issue, but Turkey found itself taking a familiar back-seat to squabbling between Russian and the U.S. over the situation. This, along with the recent hands-off approach to Russia’s Crimean adventure would seem to undermine Turkey’s desire to join the UNSC and become a power player in international affairs. Ankara, it seems, has designs on more aggressively pushing its foreign policy and world view, but first it must take risks in affairs that it has shunned over the past century. Some in the world could appreciate Turkish leadership on many issues, and Turkey appears willing to provide it, though the course to that point has been clumsy thus far. If Turkey truly wishes to assert itself it must become bolder in its pursuits.
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