AMU Homeland Security

U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Covers Disputed Islands

By William Tucker
Chief Correspondent for In Homeland Security

During a four nation Asian tour, president Obama stated that, “Article five [of the US-Japan security treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration including [the] Senkaku islands. We do not believe that they should be subject to change unilaterally.” Obama would go on to say, “This is not a new position. This is a consistent one.” Indeed, the U.S. has been rather consistent in its rhetoric regarding the Senkaku island (Diaoyu in China) dispute, but hearing Washington’s stance on the issue clearly articulated by the U.S. president – speaking from Japanese territory no less – displays the U.S. commitment to both Japan and other allies in the region. While the White House has had difficultly explaining its foreign policy goals as of late, not to mention a profound lack of strategic vision, the position regarding Japan’s claim and administration of the Senkaku islands had been inked decades before, hence Mr. Obama’s reference to a consistent position. It is worth noting that the president did further state that it “would be a profound mistake to continue to see escalation around this issue instead of dialogue.” China’s recent declaration of a air defense zone under its military cognizance covering the islands, followed by Japan’s military response, certainly upped the ante in this dispute. The last thing Washington needs is another military crisis between regional powers and the presidential tour is meant to assuage allies unnerved by Chinese maritime claims and the U.S. commitment to the region.

For the past few years the Obama administration has been intent on executing a “pivot” to the East Asian theater; however global events have to a large part stymied this goal – at least on the surface. Fortunately for U.S. and allied interests, Washington maintains roughly 35,000 troops in Japan, 28,000 in South Korea, and another 7,000 in Guam. Furthermore, the militaries of Japan and South Korea are amongst the most capable in the region. In other words, the U.S. and some of it’s allies maintain enough of a military presence in the region to raise the potential cost of adventurism by the Chinese, or even the North Koreans. Indeed, the American presence has been a major factor in limiting conflict. The U.S. military presence, however, is not the only source of interest to Washington. In an article for Foreign Policy magazine, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.” Strategic alliances in East Asia are the backbone of the economic engine that drives the region, and to no small extent, U.S. economic growth. The U.S. experienced large economic growth over the past two decades for a variety reasons not the least of which was trans-Pacific trade matching trans-Atlantic trade for the first time in history. The desire to maintain a strong presence in East Asia should be readily apparent on this fact alone.

Returning to Mr. Obama’s remarks, we are left with a lingering question. Does the desire of the U.S. to execute a pivot to China indicate that Washington is looking to contain China, or does it meant that the U.S. wishes to use its presence to ensure that Beijing rises peacefully? For the U.S. the result would be the same and the distinction may not truly matter, but for the Chinese, the former is the interpretation. China’s economic miracle is due in large part to the U.S. regional presence and strong economic ties. Pushing back against Washington too aggressively may actually serve to undermine China’s position in the short term. In the long term China wishes to eventually supplant the U.S. as the regional power, but without disrupting the interrelated commerce that drives the region. Unfortunately for China, attempting to do so would harm the relationship it has with the world’s largest consumer market for Chinese goods – the U.S. This is, of course, not considering the U.S. response to China’s plans of establishing control of the two island chains, nor does it consider that U.S. businesses and investors would seek to move their interests into less volatile regions – something that is already happening. The current paradigm of U.S. defense treaties in East Asia may not seem to be in China’s interest, but there is little they can do to remove the U.S. or even pursue their territorial claims against Japan in the near term. There is one opening that Beijing has likely considered when looking at the U.S. response to Russian moves in Ukraine. Washington may not respond too forcefully if the Chinese moved to seize territory not covered by a U.S. defense pact. So, while the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea may be the topic today, perhaps we should be watching Chinese movements in the South China Sea a bit more closely instead.

William Tucker serves as a senior security representative to a major government contractor where he acts as the Counterintelligence Officer, advises on counterterrorism issues, and prepares personnel for overseas travel. His additional duties include advising his superiors in matters concerning emergency management and business continuity planning.

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