AMU Homeland Security Intelligence Opinion Terrorism

A Look Back at the First Intifada

By Martin Scott Catino, Ph.D.
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security

When the First Intifada occurred, the uprising of Palestinians from 1987 to 1993, few observers grasped the fact that the art of insurgency had changed markedly, and the balance of power again tipped toward insurgent groups seeking asymmetrical advantages.

In short, the following changes occurred:

  1. The “spark” as agitation. From the insurgents’ perspective, events needed to spark a revolt must be strong enough to incite, reach deeply and broadly into a target population, and continue to animate.  Otherwise there will not be a mass or strong uprising.  The Palestinians perfected this art using media, mass communication, leadership, organization, and timing. In the case of the First Intifada, the death of four Palestinians in the Jabaliya Refugee camp, coupled with mass communication of the event, triggered a general uprising across the Palestinian territories (Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem). The combination of media coverage, a volatile political context, and an ad hoc action/leadership committee facilitated the event.
  1. Organization. The disparate groups and conflicted aims of insurgent leaders weaken the total capabilities and potency of operations while negating popular support. This is often the most challenging liability of non-state soldiers.  The Palestinians overcame their disunity by creating the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) and promoting bottom up organization and action.  Although led by the PLO and its affiliates, widespread support was achieved.
  1. Tactics: Nonviolent,low intensity, and target killings occurred in skilled combinations and operations creating media images that highlighted “peaceful protesters” forcefully removed from areas, rock throwing Palestinian children “brutalized” by Israeli Defense Forces and police, and little coverage of the target assassinations and kidnappings used as provocations by the Palestinian groups.
  1. Intra-Palestinian violence.  The Intifada witnessed the brutal elimination of alleged collaborators, those deemed working with Israel.  The 1,000 dead (nearly equal to the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces) often had no connection to Israel (est. at 50%), but the effect of asserting control, eliminating rivals, and creating disorder to further weaken Israeli power was achieved.
  1. Media images.The Palestinians used media images to effectively communicate a message portraying Israel as an oppressive, brutal, and occupying power using excessive force and murder to achieve its political aims. The Palestinian groups had mobilized their entire community, overwhelmed the Israeli security forces by creating pressure broadly across its area of operations, and asymmetrically against its military forces, which were not prepared for such a challenge.

The Palestinian cause had come a long way from media images of the Munich Massacre of 1972:
First Intifada

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