By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
What does it really mean to be a nation of strategy?
They do exist; although, they are very rare and often just hold the title for moments. Typically, they are states that have re-awoken. They perceive the world correctly and realize that true power must be perceived, result in positive action and display. They have reinvented themselves with a new identity and image as time passes. They are clever with words and information dominance. They display optimal virtues and uses of statecraft.
A nation of ignorance, on the other hand, fails to perceive the strategic environment correctly, or observe it at all.
A nation under the spell of reactivism does not believe things will change and is surprised when they do. The only constant in the universe is change and nations, while not mastering their environment, have learned to manipulate them. For those that do so well, we can call them nations of strategy.
Some quick examples come to mind of state actors that tinker with this idea of becoming such a nation but have not become one: Singapore, Russia, China, Iran and the Netherlands.
Singapore has become what Mely Caballero-Anthony and P. K. Hangzo described as a niche state. Aside from great financial success, Singapore has strategically positioned themselves as the masters of water monitoring and purification and export those in humanitarian situations which give them leverage diplomatically.
Russia has now become a state of tough terror against the West meddling within its borders. It meanwhile promotes ethno-nationalism within and to its diaspora communities. It uses that bully image to amass regional power but relies more on the cognizance of petro-dollars and Cold War legacy; or the remainder of nukes to make a point rather than strategy.
Antiquated strategies may work but they would no longer be enough to classify Russia as a nation of strategy; rather they become a nation of predation and intimidation. Such a reputation ultimately creates more enemies than friends. It is therefore not building and hardly thought provoking. Before the Ukraine maneuver and radical policy shift enacting “near abroad,” Putin used strategic partnerships to travel the world and reestablish his global network. Then he played a hand at regionalism as the middle-man of the Middle East between the West and Syria and Iran. Then Moscow returned to an ignorant state, apparently not liking any of those strategic directions shifting back to strategic thinking not far beyond the ushanka.
China was once thought of a strategic player. Now they are playing bumper-boats with their neighbors and rallying ethno-nationalism within their own state. Hence they have lost their previous cautious and subtle strategic edge and traded it in for a clanging gong that no one likes and that causes damage to regional ears. Once the mystery strategy was gone, they became a big and visible actor whose moves are clumsy and predictable; even if they are difficult to stop in the long-term. This does not mean they will not become more strategic in the future.
Iran has become a state model revolving around diplomacy and information warfare. It is aggressively trying to get back into the good graces of the West without losing its stake in Syria and ties in Lebanon; and now venturing into the Iraqi unknown. This latest guerrilla adventure will likely end in splitting them further apart from the modern states and making them more radically charged and militant against the sectarian menace ISIL. So their status could be a fallback to ignorance as well as reactivism but there was a glimmer of hope for a time.
The Netherlands used to be a strategic state. They believed that by hosting and hailing political integration and international institution building that they would be able to better influence. For a time, it gave them that political relevance. In the end, they were not able to account and adapt the on-going assault and disintegration of the sovereign state system. They knew only of the state system’s gradual evolution into a Western World Order; more international law and norms that states were bound to follow; international trials and perhaps more regional unions and one day a global government. Whatever the hopes and dreams, they have hit a cold reality where an alternative future is taking root against the present and desired future liberal political system. They fall prey to ignorance or self-denial.
Many of the missteps above toward strategy are the result of infantile panic or impatience rather than any sound stratagem. In adversity and with due pressure, social power structures react primarily with emotions or reason and while both are needed in any ambitious strategy, the latter is preferred. Thus, a nation is hard pressed to think if they are too emotional, socially in their public or individually through their leadership.
To be a nation of strategy implies an active thinking people that perpetually plan, implement, adapt and propel their deigns forward despite perpetual adversity. Such a state sees all relevant outcomes are anticipated and any situations are exploited as political opportunities. A state can earn this title but is always at risk of losing it.
A nation of strategy does not always mean success but it does make for identity, purpose and maximizes the survival potential, influence and relevance factor.
A nation of strategy would observe a global political crisis as the result of a mistake in policy and a failure to lead or stir the problem to its advantage. Hence a failure never has to be a complete one but the beginning of something greater.
The programs, the message, the execution- all must be altered regularly but not core socio-political values held by the people. Values and national virtue must be consistent to maximize strategic effect, amnesty and trust. This means that operations change and even the nature of operations change but ethical principles do not. If they do change, the nation state loses legitimate, trust, loyalties and potential resolutions to differences.
To be a nation of strategy means transitioning from a static, ignorant or reactionary political culture into a politically evolving one. Importantly, a preventive culture is not the same thing as a strategic culture. A preventive culture is based on calculations and predictions that are often wrong, but a strategic culture is based on the shoulder of visionaries. It cultivates planners, critical thinker, keen observers, implementers and innovators. It colonizes its ranks with such people and combines art, science and skill rather than resume or politics.
National strategy is similar to a serious game and foreign policy leaders should be exposed to strenuous ludological conditioning. The strategic victory goes to the political savvy that can weather the storm and use all failures, weaknesses and vulnerabilities as strengths to overcome rivals. The victory typically goes to the most innovative; the most adaptive; flexible and clever.
Chance plays a role but in truth this is merely a miscalculation of all relevant factors. If everything could be calculated, something new would come along and shatter the model to pieces. Thus the failure to calculate and perceive the situation means a failure or to overcome the threat, which soon must become the opportunity for resurgence. Sometimes even with a true nation of strategy, it will incur losses. It is how it continues to face and overcomes those losses and turn them into wins that classify it as strategic or not.
Lastly, a nation of strategy executes its objectives most effectively with an invisible hand and acts as a power behind powers. The goal in the implementation in plans should be felt but unseen; so as not to disturb the delicate political waters. National political strategy is ultimately about projective influence and conflict is a loss or contention for power, even if victory is expected. The direct application of force is seen as a mistakened last resort (typically for defense) rather than normal state expression. When plans fail, new ones are drawn in accordance with new realities and the process begins again with great adaptivity, removed from a direct or genuine defeat.
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