By William Tucker
Chief Correspondent for In Homeland Security
The Israeli military reported that more than 20 rockets were fired into Southern Israel from Gaza today, though most struck in open areas while three others were intercepted by the Iron Dome system. Likewise speaking with the press, an al-Quds brigade spokesman told the media that the militant organization had fired more than 70 rockets in retaliation for Israeli soldiers entering Gaza. By most counts the number claimed by al-Quds was much higher than the evidence suggests, but this barrage was still that largest since 2012. In fact, Israeli PM Netanyahu stated that 2013 witnessed the fewest rocket attacks since the Israeli military left Gaza in 2005. Israeli artillery did respond to the attack by targeting militants who were preparing to fire additional munitions. What seems to have initiated this most recent exchange was a confrontation that occurred on Tuesday in which three al-Quds militants were killed by the Israeli military. Al-Quds claimed that the soldiers had entered Gaza and their militants were responding to the incursion, while Israel stated the three men had just previously fired a mortar round. Tensions are running high between the Palestinians and Israelis in general, and for know these spats are likely to continue despite both parties claiming that the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas is still in effect.
Other recent events suggest that other angles to this exchange should be explored, however. Just this month the Israeli navy intercepted a weapons shipment from Iran allegedly meant for militants in Gaza – specifically Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.* The next day Mahmoud Al-Zahar, a senior Hamas official, stated, “The Hamas movement and Iran have taken special measures and we will see many changes in these relations soon.” Hamas and Iran have been working since at least November to repair their relationship damaged three years ago when Hamas refused to support the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war. Despite the falling out Iran maintained relations with other Gaza militants – namely PIJ – which Tehran has funded, and in some ways directed, for years. Another event that is worthy of inclusion is the recent Israeli airstrike against a weapons shipment from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Though this isn’t the first time Israel has struck a weapons shipment meant for Hezbollah, the timing of that weapons movement, the attempt to smuggle weapons into Gaza, and the rekindling of Hamas-Iranian ties following the re-outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suggest some relation in these events. The rocket barrage that occurred Wednesday evening in Southern Israel would also suggest an escalation is occurring.
Escalation is a risky premise because the outcome is not always clear and the possibility of blowback is significantly high, unless, of course, the party wishing to escalate matters can effectively divorce itself from any negative fallout. Iran could easily fit this description. Iran has several fires burning at present from its involvement in Syria to its attempts to re-ingratiate itself with several Sunni militant groups who have expressed skepticism over Iran’s support for the Assad regime. Fortunately for Tehran, the dollars that they have previously doled out to non-state actors were too badly needed and some Sunni groups are likely reconsidering their relations with Iran much like Hamas has. On the weapons smuggling front the reason behind Iranian motives at present remain obfuscated, however it is possible that Tehran is looking to keep Israel busy on multiple fronts. By stretching Israeli resources, Iran may be able to move weapons more effectively in the short term. Additionally, the U.S. has been pressuring Israel quite significantly on peace talks with the Palestinians and Iran pushing the al-Quds Brigade to muddy the waters so to speak will likely strain the U.S.-Israeli relationship further. Also worth considering is the nuclear negotiations with the West. By demonstrating Tehran’s ability to either escalate or calm regional tensions it is using a rather effective lever in negotiations. In other words, Iran wants to demonstrate that it is not without options. Of course this is all supposition, but the timing of escalating tensions in the midst of negotiations is hardly coincidental, nor is any exchange of fire between Israel and Gaza merely a local issue. There are too many moving parts in the Middle East right now to think otherwise.
*It should be noted that the al-Quds Brigade is the so-called militant wing of PIJ, however all decisions for each wing flow from the Secretary General making the distinction between the “wings” nebulous at best.
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