By William Tucker
Chief Correspondent for In Homeland Security
Somali militant group and al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab has been fighting on the back foot for some time now as African Union and other allied militaries have fought the group aggressively. For its part, al-Shabaab retreated to its strongholds in the Somali countryside and picked its battles when opportunities were presented, but with such a significant amount of pressure on the group its internal factions went from fraying at the edges to more pronounced splits. While the group is still holding together, this recent attack on a Kenyan mall may pose future problems for the group. In essence, while it is important to focus on the ongoing attack itself, it is also important to focus on the group and gauge its overall health. This current attack would seem to indicate that the group has weakened, but still retains some significant levers for retaliation.
Before discussing current matters, it is important to add some context to this alleged shift in al-Shabaab’s tactics. When the Somali group perpetrated a suicide bombing in Kampala, Uganda in 2010, the group was in a standoff with AU peacekeepers. Al-Shabaab counldn’t eject the AU force from Mogadishu, and the peacekeepers were barred from taking offensive action against the group. In response, long-time al-Qaeda veteran Fazul Abdullah Mohammed – now deceased – was given command of al-Shabaab’s intelligence unit. Shortly thereafter the attack in Kampala occurred. Though it is difficult to connect the two developments in open source material the evidence is compelling and fits with Mohammed’s expertise. Just before these developments occurred, many experts concluded that al-Shabaab would remain focused on seizing control of Somalia. This author, however, stated that the military reality on the ground coupled with the naming of Mohammed as head of intelligence signaled an impending international attack. Recent events in Kenya suggest we are seeing a similar reaction to the intense pressure – both internally and externally – that the group is under.
With al-Shabaab reeling from the constant onslaught of foreign forces intervening on behalf of the Somali federal government, it is natural for the group to look at alternative avenues with which to attack its foes. In this case, the group’s more internationalist factions viewed an attack on Kenya – which has invested significant military force in Somalia- as a justified retaliatory target. The more nationalistic faction has long shunned this view in fear of drawing more U.S. attention to the conflict, and with it, U.S. military forces. Both factions, however, are correct in their respective assessments, but the reality of a need to take some form of action in the face of such negative consequences displays the militant’s weakened state. This doesn’t mean that al-Shabaab will disappear, nor that a large western military force will makes its way to Somali shores, but it does show that al-Shabaab is struggling with its current predicament. So long as the AU and other international partners remain dedicated to pretecting the nascent federal government in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab will have little other recourse available beyond local guerilla attacks and the occasional international terrorist attack.
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