By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Last night, President Barrack Obama authorized U.S. military strikes in coordination with some of its 40 anti-ISIL coalition members in Syria’s east (Raqqa and Deir al-Zor and Hasakah provinces). This attack comes after ISIL has been able to hold and gain ground in Syria and the exodus of over 130,000 Kurds within three days flooding into Turkey after an ISIL advance on Kobane, Syria. The Khorasan al Qaeda terror cell threat to the U.S. was the official trigger.
The attack included 47 Tomahawk cruise missiles from two U.S. warships (USS Philippine Sea and the USS Arleigh Burke) in coordination with fighterjets and drones.
According to CENTCOM, the targets were specific to jihadist: “fighters, training compounds, headquarters and command and control facilities, storage facilities, a finance center, supply trucks and armed vehicles.”
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that at least 70 ISIL terrorists were killed and around 300 wounded.
Another wave of Arab airstrikes following American action has seen a varied response in the region. On the one hand it demonstrates the commitment of Sunni Arab states acting against all violent Islamic extremist groups that they cannot control. On the other hand, it shows that the Shiites are isolated from the international effort against ISIL (which is to a large extent their own fault). Nevertheless, it means that they and their support networks in Syria are in greater jeopardy than before and at some point will lose the force of presence and influence there.
Where all of this goes awry, in terms of any ongoing aerial campaign within Syria, is that the Arab allies get trigger happy and bomb the Syrian government. Not long ago, they took the lead in training and funding the jihadist fighters that have joined or formed ISIL to take out the government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
Say the Arabs bomb the Assad regime, it will not matter if this is accidental. It will bring Russia and Iran in further to create an even more restrictive and complicated airspace. They create greater enemies instead of marginal partners against ISIL. In fact, even right now, just having the Arab states involved in active airstrikes over there ally’s territorial airspace will provoke them into a more participatory role. There is a possibility that this could work to get Russia and Iran to take a more active stand but they have been unwilling or incapable of removing ISIL on their own.
The U.S. or any of its other coalition members could in time make this same mistake as well, a scenario which Russia has presented, while condemning the breach of Syria without government consent. America is not working with the Assad government (but a good number of the Arab state leaders in the coalition are just as bad-which demonstrates grave policy inconsistency).
A second equally bad outcome of Arab transnational military activities is that they trigger a pre-emptive response from the Assad regime who initiate an attack on inbound breaches airspace. Say Assad lets one, two, or three sorties go. How long will Syria continue to let his archenemies carry out aerial attacks over his state? So there is a lifespan of Syrian patience for all of this and it is likely very short.
This will become even more complicated if and when boots on the ground become needed to defeat the ISIL enemy.
To prevent the above, Washington must keep selling the mission as a humanitarian operation and try and continue to build the coalition cause and numbers of participants. It must also keep the door open for Russia and Iran and any others that want to join the league against the war criminal Islamic State.
Juggling the coalition states is an extremely delicate and difficult task, but it is one that America and its Western partners must stay in front and spearhead. Allowing the Arab states to act in rival sectarian territory will likely in the long-run prove a poor choice. Posing proudly besides them may not last. The West must lock down the airspace and assure the Russians and Iranians of the humanitarian centered mission.
The U.S. Army Special Forces motto must become that of the whole-of-government approach in Syria and Iraq, while at the same time securing the national and regional interests and constructing a more secure and safe environment. Progress there is a taller order. Defeating the enemy and rescuing the innocents is the priority.
To appease the Arabs and assuage Russian and Iranian concerns, the Western powers must work with them to find a replacement for President Bashar al Assad. While this might look similar to the removal of Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh and create a weaker central government, it may be the only political option at this point to avoid a military crisis from widening between the warring state parties in order to reset the focus where it is needed most. Like President Saleh, Syrian President Assad must have guarantees for his safety and immunity from state prosecution (not from the ICC). He should be moved to Russia or Iran but not the West.
An ‘Anyone But Assad Regime’ approach will have three immediate results that could be of major benefit: 1) it will throw all of the more moderate militants into a single-mind frame of eliminating terrorist groups like ISIL, al Qaeda and al Nusra, for example, no that Assad is not on the board. 2) It will balance hostile relations and the alleviate tensions between Russia and Iran and the Arab states. 3) A weakened central power will see a facilitated entrance of foreign powers under an international banner work with the locals without friction from the new government and with greater coordination to help: the internal displaced, stability, resettlement from refugees and reconstruction process.
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