By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Correspondent for In Homeland Security
America cannot militarily reinforce three major theaters in support of European and Asian allies and fight off the spread of three civil wars across the Middle East at the same time. Washington needs to make some hard decisions and prioritize which of these it can afford to sacrifice or walk away from.
In the case of the three, it would be impossible to rebuild the Middle East, in whose boundaries are presently being redrawn. Losing three states from the globalization process is a tragedy, but one that will not be resolved by the American military. On the other hand, a robust military presence is needed to fend off Russian and Chinese aggression, which has been taking advantage of the American distractions for over a decade and now the present retraction.
The U.S. needs a Russian and Chinese strategy. Presently, America’s respective isolation/penalty and contain/condemn policies will not yield positive or advantageous future scenarios. Such in-theater operations strategies continue to engage in reactive objective-by-objective bases. The leadership at the top fails to recognize the larger strategic aims of Russia and China. Operations must follow a political grand strategy that is lacking in all three aforementioned geopolitical regions and spheres as well as the whole. It needs to go beyond military projection and build pivot capacity in both Asia and China through massive DIMEFIL (diplomacy, information, military, economics, finance, intelligence and law enforcement) strategic operations. Where there are no one shot solutions, the U.S. must learn the art of political influence in addition to the power of economic and military power.
Isolating Russia from the international community has and will likely continue to fail. Crippling Russia’s economy has been successful but absorbed by an increasing ethno-nationalist militarizing Putin regime. Containing Russia militarily is also difficult without a strong military presence in Europe—which has been long delayed and overdue. When the U.S. left Europe, Europe got more Russia instead. Russia’s grand strategy has largely been placed on hold and centered on Ukraine and the confrontation with the West. Nevertheless, their aim is to be a great world power that rivals Europe. To do this it has attempted to both court and divide European unity through diplomacy, competition and coercion.
China’s regional strategy is a phased expansion that ignores boundaries and seeks to influence perimeter nations and utilize them as proxies either through clever statecraft or encirclement. At the same time, Beijing challenges international law often through a process of delay and deceit.
China’s grand strategy, on the other hand, is a greater game of influence that is taking all lessons learned from America and great power economics in order to project Beijing’s power internationally into political influence and control. This is done through measures of infrastructure projects in South America, Africa and throughout Asia. Many Chinese citizens and SOEs are still purchasing real estate and gold from first world countries and markets, but the ability to influence these powers from within is limited and more difficult than they first imagined. In a great sense, they have hit the Great Wall of the Western and cannot enter politically or socially. Instead, they are turning to alternative political institutional frameworks and developing state resource rights, purchases, infrastructure loans and government infiltration elsewhere; virtually preying upon weaker states or coaxing medium size ones from Russia to Sri Lanka. This also has given them strategic access to corridors such as the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal by working with Panamanian and Egyptian authorities and canal construction and maintenance projects. Lastly, the Chinese have ascended from mere bilateral negotiations to investing in global institution building.
Washington continues to think of China as located in the East but China and the future China is a global enterprise. America observes or operates silently on sub-rosa activities out of Beijing but does not face them on a strategic footing. It has the effect of making the U.S. appear weaker, vulnerable and indecisive where greater strategic whole of government action and momentum forward is required. Without global ambitions to politically defeat Russian and Chinese moves in the grand strategic game of influence, the U.S. belittles itself through fixed disparate regional operations led by waning military command structures that lack the necessary support and whose resources are spread thin across the globe, and often the wrong instruments to win a game of influence.
Much of the fault of American foreign policy lies in the heart of Washington’s inability to agree on the basics. Even regional economic projection proposals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership are struggling to elicit support bipartisan support. U.S.-Russian policy is divisive over Ukraine but also as a whole. Do we want to bring Russia back into the fold or are they too far gone? Politicians are largely indecisive with the full gamut of foreign policy.
In the Middle East, Americans want out, the president wants in, the Congress is unsure and so the Authorization to use military force against ISIS sits in limbo. Military commanders warn that the fight will take years and recommend more boots on the ground—something that Americans and politicians have apparently agreed against. While ISIS needs to be stopped, it cannot be defeated without a political alternative that is more attractive many Sunni Muslims in Syria and Iraq, who face an abusive Shia militancy found in power positions through the Syrian Allawites, Hezbollah, Shia militia, Revolutionary Guard and so forth. Such people are squeezed into the conflict and have been “lost” to any democratic protests in Syria or democratic aspirations that once existed in Iraq. Ultimately, there is now a situation of a severe loss of control over regional coalition “allies” that are now being directed independently on religious and geopolitical grounds by Saudi Arabia.
As for the Pacific, while there appears to be greater unity at home, there is just as much indecision. Most people that are in-tune with current affairs realize that containment of China is a poor choice. But there is really no strong alternative being considered. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is intended to strengthen the America’s Pacific ally positions but China is already disrupting U.S. and ally economic relations with the AIIB. Washington is uncertain of a, ‘What next move?’ It is unwilling to take a tougher stance against human rights and free speech or more courageous approach of penalties with Chinese negative/destructive e behavior on the seas. This is still due to the trade dependence and the hesitancy of offense; and this has been America’s failure all along. It is the position of “feeding the caged dragon.” Eventually the dragon grows too big for its cage, breaks free and eats its jailers from house and home.
As long as the U.S. continues to sponsor contradictory foreign policies and remains stretched thin committedly to Europe, the Middle East and Asian affairs, the U.S. cannot expect to improve its political projective power of influence in those regions. In other words, do more with less. Get more results with less money, less man power, less use of force, less old-American statecraft and turn toward the future of better technology, information dominance, intelligence infiltration and direction and diplomacy.
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