By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Max G. Manwaring’s Strategic Studies Institute Publication, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency” is an excellent thought-piece that shows some fundamental similarities between criminal street gangs and urban insurgency environments. His application is applied mainly to foreign crisis states, particularly in Latin America, but the a similar approach might be used within the USA.
Why the connection of street gangs and insurgents?
Manwaring wrote published the paper in 2005, when counterinsurgency was becoming big business overseas and a virtual American enterprise. An insurgency seeks to undermine the standing authority through organization, subversion and rebellion.
The connection to street gangs internationally, but interestingly in the US as well, is that gangs defy the local rule of law and establish their own power center of their own. Presently, too many mayoral and law enforcement authorities in the US effectively tolerate enclaves within their jurisdiction; and primarily through low-income residential areas, permit their existence. The psychology is that all inconspicuous and or isolated criminal behavior from middle to higher class and business facilities is considered a victory but in fact is a virtual [criminal] insurgency.
A loss of control of the rule of law in any part of the city and a concentration of criminal behavior in the remote or impoverished parts is first off a loss of territorial control. Second, it is a base of operations for what Manwaring calls a “mutated” form of insurgency whose end goal could be the penetration and corruption influence of local governing authorities. No doubt, law enforcement, prison systems, school systems and many other municipal functions are all placed in greater jeopardy through entanglement and cross-city migration.
Just because the criminal street gang does not act directly and openly rebel against the authorities does not mean that it does not threaten or undermine their power establishment and their institutions. What happens is a subtle, theft of territory, creating a second tier and bypassed the rule of law for the gang code and creed. Moreover, the growth of street gangs over time are icebergs where gang wars and other violent crime are only the surface. Cross-state, nationwide, international, cartel connections and other larger criminal threat and black-market activities are all involved underneath and around these criminals and havens.
The street gang often becomes the center of distribution and supply channels for narcotics and weapons, as well as the flexible joints of city-wide crime and criminal influence and foreign criminal penetration and virtual ownership of certain cities. For the Department of Homeland Security, these people become virtual transient ports of criminal transmission and terrorist vulnerability while for the local and state governments they are looked at as high-crime areas.
The idea of ‘taking back the streets’ is not a new one in America; nor are gangs the ‘new’ risk or insurgency. Gang task forces are as old as gangs and gangs themselves go back to the early days of the New York mob and so on. They are just as dangerous now and are increasingly becoming more complex, interconnected and powerful. The problem is that they are Manwaring describes, a “silent challenge to sovereignty” and “Wizard’s Chess” where each maneuver is often unseen and the authorities must find out which pieces have been moved.
Manwaring’s contribution is a unique presentation of rethinking the criminal street gang with a store of knowledge after two major foreign military operations involving counter-insurgency techniques.
So the question is: Could just thinking about these gangs as counterinsurgency warfare improve the rule of law in American cities? Secondly, can local mayors, city councils and law enforcement combat the gangs effectively using modified operations and tactics? Third, is it just a lack of motivation and previous tactics that have allowed street gangs to take root- keeping in in mind: the psychology of broken homes, the need to belong, the rebellion of class warfare, poverty, race, immigration, coercion, intimidation and other triggers of criminal gang initiation, participation and growth?
If cities really want to ‘take back their streets’ beyond the political slogans and the ‘make the people feel safer’ strategies, it might be possible with a counter-insurgent frame of mind. Gang territories become “failed” zones, instead of red zones, much like failed states in the international arena.
Manwaring notes the “erosion of democracy” within these spheres caused by street gangs. Criminal uprisings too can typically take the form of riots, gang wars and shooting sprees.
It would not be cheap, it would not be short, it would not be easy, but it is possible; and certainly it would be better than letting the gangs grow, develop, flourish and mutate into something else in the future. So the task of eliminating the street gang in counter-gang inner city warfare becomes a reality, rather than a wish.
Manwaring encourages a holistic approach. While his thinking is directed more universally, the same might be adapted for the American city landscape, using: outreach and communication (diplomacy efforts), social-economic (addressing impoverished needs and reaching alleviation goals); psychological or informational (convincing the enemy to surrender, civilize, repopulate, etc.); and lastly policing and enforcement of the rule of law and territorial control (increased activity, armed presence, intelligence and surveillance, warrants, task forces, operations, community relations enhancement, etc.).
Perhaps the problem is a lack of singular strategic focus and vision. Seeing the problem as a crime problem and police solution is potentially the biggest drawback. Going beyond arresting criminals and going into neutralizing the entire existent of the street gang and seeing this as a form of warfare might be needed to defeat it. The city would do better to rethink this through counter-insurgency mind-frame, using modified tactical procedures learned overseas with a holistic, full local government approach. This means using all, not just enforcing procedures, methods and tactics at the grass-roots level form a bottom-up and neighborhood, block-by-block, door-to-door activities. In addition, all counter-gang efforts would require strong community support and participation; as well as continued and enhanced joint state and federal assistance and resources.
Reference: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=597
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