By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Unification of Iraq is always possible and has been done before, but it becomes more and more difficult now. Even with the Islamic State, there remains only one path to any political reunification. Without a concerted settlement of foreign state interests in Iraq, there can be no political unifier.
The internal changes within Baghdad government changes only the person, not even the ruling party or sect. Arab and Sunni states, as well as Iraqi Sunnis, for example, cannot accept the new Iranian-backed prime minister. It goes far beyond an internal political crisis.
The abdication of Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al Maliki, who has pledged to step down amidst foreign and internal pressure and a new appointment of Haider al Ibadi, will unfortunately not be enough to change the tide of sectarian divisions. Both al Maliki and al Ibadi are members of the same predominant Shiite Dawa party that supports a Shiite state of Iraq. At best, it remains a positive first, short-term, step forward politically.
Iraq is currently fragmented into three major geopolitical areas and divided along three major sectarian lines: the Shiite Muslims of Baghdad that make up the official central government, the Sunni Muslims of the East that are now ruled by the Islamic State and the ethnic Kurds of the North that are under siege and embracing the refugee crisis in the hundreds of thousands.
American airpower enters the equation to offset the Islamic State’s territorial advance and retake some operational losses in the North but remains a politically insolvent solution for the country as a whole.
Minority groups are being purged by the Islamic State right now but that is to be expected also by the other sects in the future as it has in the past. Also, one must remember the Sunnis were once in charge of all Iraq under an Arab nationalist banner in the form of the Baathist party. How similar is that from the view of the Sunni, who now live underneath the Dawa Party coalition, under the semi-secular Shiite ‘nationalist’ banner?
The common enemy of the Iraqi Sunnis will soon be removed from office but it may not be enough to replace al Maliki, who can largely be blamed for persecution and discrimination but the overall sectarian strife which far precedes him. He is therefore not the solution but only a partial appeasement. The Sunnis, who have been persecuted by him, will also push for greater “justice” and quite possibly rally for his imprisonment and then execution, at some point, if not immediately. A true transition of power is always violent and the absence of trial for Maliki will convince them to continue their mistrust of Baghdad. The Islamic State will again attempt to champion their cause.
At the other end of the spectrum, powerful iconic Shiite rivals to al Ibadi are also still very much contenders within the Baghdad political system. And unlike the Sunni who are estranged from it, partly by choice and also by pragmatic irrelevance, the Shiite contenders will be allowed to further radicalize any moderate Shiite in office and continually challenge him. They will over time, most likely end up radicalizing him or supplanting him with a more extreme and marginalized Shiite leader within the overarching sectarian civil war.
Al Maliki should leave Iraq, the sooner the better, and become a forgotten memory. The new leader should be seen as a provisional authority and take power immediately and offer a justice and equality for all approach while convincing the Sunni Iraqis and the Arab states of shrugging off the Islamic State in Iraq.
But in truth, there really needs to be another constitutional convention to address the political crisis—one that addresses the three powers to greater satisfaction and foreign state realities within Iraq. Sunni interests can also be represented in absentia by the leadership found among the refugees, who can speak for the people with candidness. It must deeply address the Sunni and minority plight and create a civil political system that solves it.
Foreign state intervention caused the present situation and threatens to amplify it as foreign interests undoubtedly carve up Iraq’s future. Presently, Iran wants to keep the floodgate of Sunni influence at bay and project back. The Arab states have a two-faced approach against the Islamic State, with fears that the Shiites will regain power over Sunni areas; meanwhile the rulers are genuinely alarmed at the spread of the Islamic State, while the populations have many sympathizers. The U.S. wants to protect the Kurds, the Yazidis, the Christians and all the rest being targeted by the Islamic State, as no one else can or will. Washington is done with playing either side.
It is not enough to rescue the Yazidis and the Sunni population under the threat of the Islamic State or abandon the Kurds. The new American Iraqi policy is going to include a rededicated effort to the indirect elimination of the Islamic State. So far aerial campaigns have already swelled to hundreds. This is the military policy, however, which cannot become the stand-alone policy. The whole nature of Iraq must be reevaluated and the West and the region must take on some compromises to save it.
It is not enough to eliminate the Islamic State militarily. On the political side of things, the U.S. has yet to channel the foreign interests into a unique mosaic that will allow the survival of any Iraqi nation-state cohesion. That must include bringing the Arabs, the Iranians and the Iraqis to the table, along with the international community.
Whether the foreign support (or projecting influence) into Iraq is settled in a room or on the battlefield, foreign state interests will continue to be the largest factor in Iraq; whether through proxies, political colonial implants within parties; funding, access, lobbies, resources, information influence, terrorism or shared borders.
Washington needs a better relationship with Tehran, a continued relationship with Riyadh and Ankara and the world to come together and work for the Iraqi people, rather than against them. The alternative will most likely be more war and the inevitable occupation and or annexation by neighboring states. If Washington is unwilling to engage with others and share Iraq politically, it may unfortunately no longer be welcome in deciding its fate.
Comments are closed.