Iran and the ‘Shia Crescent’

By Dr. Scott Catino
School of Security and Global Studies, AMU

Although the exact posturing and organization of the “Shia Crescent” is debated, there is no doubt a clear network exists of partners associated with Iran (Shia and non-Shia) who openly seek to undermine U.S. interests, and operate globally with increasing zeal and reach. Iran has long vowed, supported and operated alongside these partners like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, using a variety of soft and hard power.

From Latin America, to Iraq and Afghanistan, to Bahrain and even Mexico, observers of current events will find the Shia Crescent at work. This term “Shia Crescent” is not an indictment against the moderate Shia believers who renounce radicalism, but it is a stark acknowledgment of the reality that Iran has co-opted many Shia communities, their grievances and legitimate concerns, and continues to orient them toward a radical agenda of confrontation, armed violence, and subversive activities penetrating legitimate political processes as well as criminal enterprises.

The following points are salient:

1. Tehran’s Objective. Iran has a very clear agenda to use non-state soldiers to undermine Western interests and spread Iranian influence. Iranian constitutional law, high leadership declarations, military organization and posture, and a host of operations of its Quds forces in Iraq and the region and globally, provide overwhelming evidence of this fact. The link between state and non-state soldiers is thus important for our study.
2. The nuclear threat. If Iran ever obtains nuclear weapons it will not have to use them to be effective. The mere threat of using them will check or checkmate an opponent by thrusting the fight to the level of non-state soldiers (Low Intensity Conflict) where Iran excels. This may prove to be the most important aspect of obtaining nuclear weapons. That said, many experts are convinced that Iran could and would use nuclear weapons.
3. A Wide and Popular Appeal. Non-state soldiers surface in the Middle East under Iranian patronage and support even though these groups may not be Shia. The fact is Iran has developed an extraordinary ability to capture, partner with, and motivate disaffected young and middle-aged citizens, and partner with disaffected groups like Hamas, which are Sunni in belief. This wide appeal will continue to foster an environment where non-state soldiers thrive.
4. Bottom up Strategy. The non-state soldiers under the Shia Crescent have aptly exploited the social and culture terrain by creating a social network offering jobs, emergency aid, religious identification and organization, and inspiration. Hezbollah has used this strategy, and developed a militant social movement into a political one, even though it vowed not to form a political party in Lebanon and participate in the parliamentary politics.
5. Deadly strikes. Non-state soldiers working in this system have accomplished deadly attacks on US and partner personnel and assets. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iranian influence and use of non-state soldiers are open and aggressive, we find high profile terrorist attacks like the Khobar Towers, where the regional Hezbollah conducted a major attack on a facility housing US and Saudi personnel.
6. Geo-politics of the Shia Crescent. In context, it should be understood that the Shia Crescent emanating from Iran seeks to sweep through the Middle East, thrusting through Iraq, Syria, and extending into the Levant and Palestine.

Yet, Iran has a remarkable ability to “leap frog,” or move beyond a regional theater and operate globally. Despite Western efforts to contain Iranian influence and its use of proxies in the Middle East, Iran continues to support the development of hostile forces beyond this region.

The involvement of non-state soldiers in the Shia Crescent will remain a major challenge to U.S. security in the foreseeable future. Understanding these dynamics is essential.

About the Author
Dr. Scott Catino is a U.S. Fulbright Scholar, Adjunct Professor of Graduate Military Studies at American Military University, and serves full time as an Associate Dean of Doctoral and Strategic Studies. He served in the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan in various supervisory, intelligence, and research posts for the US Army.

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