By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Correspondent for In Homeland Security
On the agenda for Iraqi security forces is the recapture of Tikrit and the whole Salahuddin Province from ISIS control. Reports are coming in that illustrate an advantage of Baghdad and the 23,000 involved in the offensive. However, the advantage might lie with Tehran and its growing influence.
Iraqi Federal Police spokesman Colonel Mohammed Ibrahim proudly said, “ISIS members were surprised by the fighting tactics the security forces employed by engaging them from multiple directions, encircling and surrounding them, leaving the main roads and opening paths through the farms.”
Playing down the level of tactics used by Iraq and Iranian military advisors on a plane ride to Iraq, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Demsey said, “I wouldn’t describe it as a sophisticated military manoeuvre.”
U.S. airpower was denied in the efforts to retake Tikrit. Washington rightly wants to see that the Iraqi forces have the willpower for victory. Congress is slow in debating a draft war powers resolution to allow the president prolonged military force against ISIS. All in all, the U.S. has, in the eyes of Baghdad, held back.
According to the Fiscal Times, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones asked Iraq not to request help in the offensive of Tikrit. Iraq has been aligning itself more and more with Iran both because it needs all the help it can and because it feels closer to Iran in many ways than the U.S. This does not imply a replacement, but there is an important competition arising. There appears to be an impending special relationship that will someday supplant U.S.-Iraqi relations in the future, at the present course and speed.
The U.S.-Iraq split has already reached a crisis with joint military operations, such as this last offensive. The likely suspects are Iranian weeds. Most important, there is the situation of Iran visibly nesting its military commanders within the ranks of the Shiite Iraqi forces and militias. This complicates American military activities because American leaders are not willing to be seen cooperating with Iranians who are supporting the dictator President Bashr al Assad of Syria.
The increased Iranian military assistance throughout Iraq is not a hostile act against the U.S., but it is a political subversive. This is viewed by the U.S. increasingly as an aggressive political competition. Initially, Iran was slower to field units in Iraq because of Washington’s military presence, influence and lack of acceptance. Now, a loss of control and the distaste for partnership are placing a wedge in the unity coalition against ISIS in Iraq, which may lead to larger political problems and relations in the future. But while Washington does not want to reward Iraq for allying with Iran, it must continue to fight ISIS while Iran gains more and more influence.
The success of the offensive at Tikrit without U.S. support and the help of Tehran may have the opposite effect of drawing greater Iranian troops into Iraq. Each side is ridiculously claiming that they are better partners. The U.S. is placing itself at the mercy of Iraq, which seems ludicrous. America tries to convince Baghdad that its air raids are most effective while Iran claims that its military “advisers” have more effective on the ground in a senseless tug-of-war.
The U.S. must maintain a position that it does not need to be in Iraq at all. On the other hand, Baghdad and Tehran clearly know that Washington does not want to ‘lose’ Iraq to Iran. Therefore they are using a political strategy that influences our decision-making process and controls our pieces on the ground. In other words, they are manipulating Washington, which still does not have any political strategy for Iraq; and they will continue to do so until Washington decides what it wants or declares Shiite Iraq lost to the Iranians.
There is no wishful thinking that works to oust Iran from Iraq—or minimizes their presence—if that is what Washington wants to see first. They need a clear understanding of what is possible or not possible at this time: a grand vision of what they want to accomplish and that the American people can agree to; objectives that can change as needed, realistic knowledge of their present political posture (beyond firepower alone); their realistic capability and will to accomplish the objectives and bring about their vision—the political strategy must read like battle plans in a theater of war. Until they have it, the military may one day defeat ISIS only to wake up and find that Iran has just annexed eastern Iraq and now controls the heart of the Persian Gulf.
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