By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Immediately after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) swept through Sunni western Iraq, wresting it from Iraqi security forces, the Kurds began seizing what they consider predominantly Kurdish areas.
The Shia have largely done the same in the east by holding territory they had in numbers but are strongly affiliated and constitute the de facto central government and military.
The American plan for Iraq was to originally keep it together as an inclusive democracy project. It seems simple enough now: just let them create three separate countries around religious or ethnic identity, right? Done.
The problem was and remains the access to the petroleum based resources that are not equally shared among the predominant areas as well as the on-going violence and schism. Oil reserves and infrastructure is mostly concentrated in the north and southeast, under Kurdish and Shia occupied territories. Keeping Iraq together as one entity ensured the Sunnis oil wealth that would be shared and it also was intended to keep the Shia-Kurd dispute from accelerating into conflict, as the Shia make up a majority of Iraqis and demanded the oil to the North as well as some cities in dispute.
In hindsight, it might have made sense to let the three operate in largely autonomous political tracks but sectarian violence and insurgency was mixed with foreign terrorism and external interests as well. Strong outside political objectives always been adamant in dividing Iraq since the beginning along the lines mentioned above.
The Turkish did not at first want a Kurdish state. Now they trade more than $8 billion in oil with the Kurds and their new policy of unilateral oil exports, which go against the law. They are emboldened since the recent capture of major city of Kirkuk, after repelling ISIL terrorists. Anchora has effectively recognized them as acting sovereign and said that it is now even supportive of a Kurdish state in the North of Iraq.
In many ways, they deserve one; at least with the help of American intervention. The U.S. failed to respond appropriately to the Saddam government crackdowns in the 1990s. The Kurds were gassed before that in the Iraq-Iran war, which Washington gave arms and supplies to Saddam. The formation of a new government in Iraq during US liberation never resulted in one. So with this history of betrayal and long waiting, the Kurds are trying to seize the opportunity for themselves and realize their own state. For them, this dream makes sense.
For the Sunni, they were the privileged religious sect and people of Saddam Hussein. After he was thrown out and then executed, and in spite of all attempts in creating equality and forgetfulness, the Sunni were targeted for political retribution by many of the Shia and discriminated against by the majority Shia who were persecuted under them as second class citizens and who naturally climbed to power in the new democracy amid some constitutional safeguards. The necessary power-sharing never resulted in practice.
President Barack Obama has stressed that he does not want to work with Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki or Iran, unless the two can demonstrate that they do not just stand for Shia dominated Iraq. Washington is holding fast to the design of a unified Iraq as well and a political solution, rather than an attempt at a military option under false aspiration or pretense.
But the reality of maintaining a unified Iraq is most likely lost; and not just because of the Sunni-Shia divide being reported. The Kurds have sworn they will not give back the cities they have seized and neither in all likelihood will the Sunni; even if the ISIL Sunni movement evaporates, implodes or is morphed into something else.
Promising the Sunni and Kurds greater inclusion and autonomy might work but for the moment they already have and are realizing their own complete self-rule by the minute. In the case of the Sunni, many are held as hostages to the furthest reaches of fundamentalist Sunni Islam against their will.
A strategic mistake by ISIL might be the targeting of oil refineries, such as the one in Beiji, in which the end result is that the entire state suffers. Production there makes up a quarter of the country’s needs, as well as domestic fuel and power needs.
The president has increased his original military adviser count from 300 to 600 troops.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said: “These special operators will assess the situation on the ground, help evaluate gaps in Iraqi security forces, and increase their capacity to counter the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” Precision drone and missile strikes are on hold for the time being.
The U.S., the opponents in parliament of Iraq, as well as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are demanding new leadership in Iraq and for Maliki to step down but the procedure could take weeks, which is a long time as Iraq remains split in three. Replacement or even a quick resignation is likely too little too late. Still, a new government is essential for any new and positive developments.
National security forces have proved resilient in defending against ISIL in largely Shia areas so far, with only minor gains elsewhere as they are stretched thin and recruiting a force that is almost entirely Shia.
As a sovereign country, Iraq’s fate is its own. Any military action the U.S. pursues will likely be to neutralize ISIL terrorists without aggravating any sectarian or ethnic divides between Sunni and Shia Iraqi Arabs or the Sunni Kurds.
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