By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
A fundamentalist Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), once an al-Qaida affiliate but latter disowned by al-Qaida number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, is emerging before our eyes. If al-Qaida was the revolution in violent international fundamentalist Islam, then ISIL is the implementation of territorial political gains through Muslim conflicts.
Something that was not even thought possible a few years ago is now a grim reality. A real ISIL is being attempted by the terrorist group with a strategy of seize and replace; taking one piece of Iraq at a time, with the reluctant indirect support of Arab states and full support of angry local sympathizers. The intended effect is the establishment of strongholds for Sunni Muslims within those states, while launching terrorist attacks and militant strikes in the Levant region and purging Shiite interests.
In Iraq, ISIL has already seized and effectively held territory in major cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul (Iraq’s second largest city acting as the Sunni capital). The terrorist group also has operational control in Western Iraq’s Anbar and Nineveh provinces as well as northern Syria bordering Turkey.
ISIL was supported up by Arab states indirectly through various parties which funneled funds and supplies.
ISIL was a progeny of convenience beginning with remnants of al-Qaida in Iraq, reinvigorated Arab state support efforts for salafist jihadists in the Syrian Civil War and recent sponsoring of Sunni uprising in Iraqis Sunni Muslim communities near their borders. Moreover, a number of Sunni leaders and organizations contribute or sponsor them worldwide.
ISIL should be seen more as a developing movement than a particular terrorist group. ISIL is an outlet of greater Sunni Muslim rage for locals. These individuals feel their beliefs and needs are either jeopardized or unmet by Shiia authority figures. The ISIL organizers have therefore mastered the art of wresting territory but as a movement of anger lack in skills of governance; thus, ISIL has only mastered one part of a strategy of seize and hold.
Nevertheless, the ISIL phenomenon is a war against the governments of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki only as a suit for territorial seizure; while still committing acts of terror.
The reason for ISIL success is not the group’s indirect support from their previous international jihadist backers or governments on and off but their necessity of long-term effectiveness in the eyes of powerful Sunni leaders, who wage a de facto covert jihad against Iranian religious leaders.
The Iranians have for years backed a once more radicalized version of Hezbollah which might have been the original model of efforts to steer them. Hezbollah became politicized in Lebanon and is used as an effective mercenary Shitte militia of terror against Israel and Arab interests. ISIL may have been seen by Sunni power players as a first wave necessity to gain a foothold and secure targeted populations. Even their lack of support to stop them outside of their borders was a sort of collaboration or tolerance feeding the sectarian outbreak. The next phase may then be one of replacement or moderation; either expected and or engineered and responsive to Sunni regional leadership.
But such thinking is infantile fantasy for those states and organizational leaders who think they can control a charged sociological emotion. In their reasoned phase two scenario, ISIL is given real political power over multiple cities is a sure way for chaos that will be more difficult to for them to diffuse and take much longer than even Sunni leaders directly or indirectly realize across the board. In other words, such actors are literally playing with fire, as they have done before. But this time, they may not be able to redirect the flames to an external enemy. Their reign may get burned in the process as fundamentalist players internally consume them. Already they are experiencing blowback,; especially states formerly leading the charge in aid to fundamentalist cells in the Syrian Civil War.
Does Washington have a responsibility here to eliminate ISIL? What is the time frame or threshold the U.S. is willing to accept? What support should it help al Maliki or even Tehran balance ISIL? Is such a task really possible with a minimum footprint in the region?
Is it better for Washington and Europe simply let the Sunni and Shiite divide naturally as they are doing right now; even if this means a great deal of violence and a more radicalized and potentially “Taliban-like” conditions imposed in the held Sunni territories under ISIL control?
Within the greater context of sectarian jihadist turmoil in the Middle East, the spread throughout Central Asia and the world, America’s best option becomes one of continued display of minimal direct involvement and making sure neither side is victorious.
Nevertheless, America must not accept the status quo of violent conflict. Washington should seek the most peaceful outcome within the region and the world. Naturally, this will mean an effort to calm the dividing rift while at the same time not become the target and dealing efficiently with what is happening underground.
The U.S. must work with more sensible leaders. The boarder access to more regional players must be paired with massive ideological penetration. Such infrastructure toward information campaigns will require a Cold War era information and intelligence presence within the region. The programs and projects should promote modern, moderate, semi-secular and passive Islam in the region that will serve as a resistance to radical Sunni and Shiite extremists.
Lastly, a reigning-in of Turkish Islamism, stressing greater secular politics and rights and a surreptitious relationship with the new Iranian government might balance this equation while a continued overt support for Saudi Arabia will continue to stoke the flames of ISIL. Washington must have a direct access channel to Tehran amid this destabilizing regional ISIL and Tehran is most likely willing to take help, albeit cautiously. This might also insure a de facto truce with Israel-Iran held together by the U.S. and more leverage on the P5+1 nuclear issue.
In the Middle East, “the enemy of my enemy is NOT my friend.” However, the adage, “I keep my friends close and my enemies even closer,” must unfortunately become American Middle Eastern policy; meanwhile Washington must not visibly show any favoritism in the region if it desires to maintain any outsider legitimacy.
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