Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
Wile an aggressive response is not justified in most scenarios of international relations, with the kidnapping and detaining of an 85 year old American Korean War veteran for war crimes, the North Koreans have proven once again that there really is no de facto armistice between the two states and that they are in a standoff regional war- which means North Korea still believes it can do virtually anything it wants, short of any moves that would insight large scale retaliation or the shut-off of a Chinese life-line completely. Their survival depends on being belligerent. This needs to change.
The US could, for one, respond more aggressively beyond condemning the action diplomatically. Boldly kidnapping of the North Korean ‘Great Leader’ Kim Jong-un and holding the man for ‘crimes against humanity’ would be one such extreme action. His crimes against humanity include threatening nuclear war, inciting to threaten nuclear war to states in the region; kidnapping, detention of foreign nationals, torture, murder and a long list following from the Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention Protocols. Please drop Mr. Kim to your nearest international tribunal. Thank you for your cooperation.
Could this be done? This would certainly be one of the most daring snatch and grab projects ever undertaken in recent history. Still, if Denise Rodman can get close to the cult leader, at least a certain American type can. On the other hand, in any operation- especially targeting a high profile political leader of a foreign state- there is a chance of major blow-back. Everybody remember Fidel Castro’s Cuba, circa 1960s?
But this act would be a declaration of war. True, but to the North Koreans, we really are involved in a hot war that they cannot win. The US just does not recognize the war- only one side does. How long can you ignore a madman and his Kingdom forever? Moreover, North does not have China’s blessing or backing to alter the course of regional instability to the degree of a total war involving their 1.2 million troops and other conventional or nuclear attacks. Things have settled not to the point of neutrality but to the point of North Korea’s inability to produce any substantial gain on any substantial attack. They are reduced at taking pot shots at Americans and their allies. But how long can this position continue? And should we risk any more hostility or step in to rattle the cage?
If the operation(s) of kidnapping Kim was to fail and the US was identified as the culprit breaching state sovereignty and attempting to nab the South Korean leadership, there might be greater hostility and even small concessions made on the part of the US through back diplomatic channels. Their might be a case of war or an attempted missile strike but that would end even worse for a strangled Pyongyang.
Yet what if another country could pull it off altogether or non-government die-hards? And what if it Operation Mickey Mouse Rendition could be achieved successfully?
Response? If the leadership of North Korea was decapitated, as is likely taking place with the recent removal of the Uncle (Jang Song Thaek). There were also some executions at the top. Jang was in charge of the National Defense Commission and a department head of the ruling Workers Party- the two most powerful posts and with seen as one of the rulers behind the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ throne. It is possible that with the thrust of instability at the top, the loss of the iconic hero or even a sudden disappearance without credit or claim to what happened to the Kim Dynasty Line, the state would implode. There might be a narrow window for anti-DPRK activity.
Little was known about the power structure of the North Korea for a long time. Things have slowly come to light. The military generals also hold great power, aside from the Kim heirs and relatives- all are Party members. This is not eh first time since 2011, when Kim Jong-il’s son took power that another leader has been removed. Ri Yong-ho was Chief of General Staff of the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) in 2012 and placed under house arrest. Media sources say he died in a shoot-out with Politburo troops. Such coups or grabs at power have been gradual in Kim’s attempt at securing his rule and the new transition against the old guard.
Retaliation to the South Koreans and potentially Japan or the US fleet will always be the biggest worry? Still, the US must not operate ever in fear. There is a time when a Pit-Bull state needs either a fix or a broken jaw and a cage. Retaliation might be prevented if the state imploded at faster than it could project outwards. And who would it retaliate against if it could not be determined who was involved?
China is the main problem to all intelligence access and operations into the DPRK. It is not that they are highly effective at counterintelligence but that they will likely know our plan as it develops through their operatives gathering intel in the US and South Korea. If China gets wind of it, it’s all over.
If South Korea caught on, then they may become more antagonistic than China. On the other hand, the South Korean National Intelligence Service might be more than happy to brainstorm possible ways to pacify the North that involved less visible and overt military means. But it is a risk telling them or even not telling them.
Would this objective ultimately prove operationally capable and sound?
Would the result be a weakened North Korea?
Would it be strategically sound?
Would an era of international kidnapping wars result or would states realize that there is a right to kidnap from another state a citizen only after transgressions of the same kind were made?
What would the follow up operations be to increase control and stability of the Korean Peninsula?
What would the consequences be?
Whatever the US does and allies do decide to eventually do with North Korea, the Americans, South Koreans and the Japanese must remember that the national abduction of one Merrill E. Newman is not an isolated case but a practice of DPRK policy against its perceived enemies. If they can continue to get away with it, they will and such abductions may increase among their other hostile activities. By addressing the problem with action, the US and allies do reinforce the status quo international law which makes it illegal to abduct and detain the citizens of another state. So a bigger question is, will the US and company find a way to hold North Korean leadership responsible in a way that does the least amount of harm to the people and the greatest regional advantage?
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