By Dr. Yoav Gortzak
Faculty Member, International Relations at American Public University
The successful ouster of Libyan strongman Muammar Khaddafi –with the help of the U.S. and its NATO allies—has led to calls for a repeat performance in Syria. After all, the two cases bear striking similarities. Just like in Libya, a brutal dictator has turned against his own people in Syria. While a comparison between Syria and Libya may seem attractive, a realistic assessment of these two cases suggests that the U.S. should be careful in adopting the Libyan campaign as a template for increased intervention in Syria.
The Case for Syrian Intervention
Using everything from air power to ballistic missiles and, according to some reports, chemical weapons, the Assad regime has engaged in a campaign of widespread violence against the Syrian population in an effort to retain its hold over the country. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the death toll in Syria may have already reached more than 200,000. Given these similarities, and the ostensible success of the American-led intervention in Libya, it is not altogether surprising that some voices in the U.S. have called for us to intervene in Syria.
One of the leading proponents of increased American involvement in the Syrian conflict, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), has called for the imposition of a U.S.-led “no-fly zone,” attacks on Bashar Assad’s air assets, and shipments of weaponry to the Syrian rebels. As in Libya, these steps would enable the U.S. to shift the balance of power in Syria towards the rebels, without requiring American troops to be present on Syrian soil.
The Same, But Different
A realistic assessment of the main differences and similarities of the situation in Libya and the current state of Syria suggests that the U.S. should be careful in applying the Libyan campaign as a template for action in Syria. The differences suggest that military intervention by a broad-based international coalition may simply not be possible and that the measures called for by Senator McCain will be insufficient to topple the Assad regime.
The similarities between the two cases suggest that the toppling of the Assad regime, while bringing humanitarian relief, may produce significant detrimental strategic implications for the U.S. and its allies in the region. Therefore, American policymakers should consider these similarities and differences carefully before they heed calls for more assertive military intervention in the Syrian conflict.
Key differences
Proponents of applying the Libyan model to the Syrian conflict should take two major differences into account. First, while members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted the Libyan campaign they received U.N. authorization. Crucially, neither China nor Russia vetoed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, which established the no-fly zone over Libya. It is highly unlikely that Russia or China would allow a similar resolution regarding Syria to pass without a veto. Russia sees the Assad regime as an important ally in the Middle East. The Russians have already vetoed similar resolutions on this issue. While it is certainly not unprecedented for the U.S. and its allies to act in the absence of explicit U.N. authorization, doing so would greatly increase the tension between the U.S. and Russia.
A second significant difference is operational in nature. According to the proponents of increased intervention in Syria, the Libyan campaign was quite successful. NATO air-strikes and support for Libyan rebels eventually allowed Khaddafi’s opponents to overcome his armed forces. No American boots on the ground were needed to achieve this result. In other words, the campaign delivered the desired results at a minimal cost to the U.S. and its allies.
What remains unmentioned in this narrative is the fact that Khadaffi’s armed forces were quite weak. Fearing internal dissent more than external threats, the Libyan strongman had for years undermined the operational capabilities of his armed forces. As a result, the Libyan rebels did not face a well-organized, well-equipped, and well-trained military foe. Even then, they needed significant support, including foreign trainers, to help them overcome Khaddafi’s forces.
While the Syrian army may have its shortcomings, it is a much more formidable military organization. The Syrian army is better organized, better trained, better equipped, and better funded than the Libyan army. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Syrian rebels are incapable of defeating the Syrian military without significant foreign support. This has been even more evident since the Lebanese-based Hezbollah has started sending its fighters across the border with Syria to support Assad’s fight against the largely Sunni rebels.
Key Similarities
The differences between Syria and Libya should give supporters of increased intervention some pause. The similarities between the two countries should reinforce this. For instance, just like in Libya, the opposition against the ruling regime in Syria is far from unified. In fact, it is quite fragmented, consisting of groups with a wide variety of goals and motivations, ranging from those seeking western-style democratic reforms, to the Jihadi-Salafi Al Nusra front. It is the latter which seem to be the most effective anti-regime force.
It would not be prudent for the U.S. and its allies to extend support to the Al Nusra front and other Salafi groups within Syria, given their antagonism towards the U.S. and its western allies. There seem to be very few viable candidates for significant military aid. If military viability is a criterion for supporting a resistance group, the U.S. choices are very limited, if not completely unavailable.
A second significant similarity between Syria and Libya is fragmentation. It is quite likely that Assad’s ouster will yield more chaos and violence in Syria, as Sunnis, Shi’a (and Alawites), Druze, and Kurds will jockey for position. A Syria in such a transitional phase could very well become a safe-haven for Al Qaida affiliates. This would form a direct threat to the U.S. and to its allies in the region, including Israel.
No good choices
A realistic assessment of the Libyan template or model therefore suggests that U.S.-led intervention in Syria will increase tensions between the U.S. and other great powers in the world, while it would likely not get a U.N. stamp of approval. Defeating Assad will likely require more effort on the part of the U.S. and its allies than the removal of Khaddafi in Libya. Finally, even a US-supported military victory of the Syrian rebels is likely to create significant geostrategic challenges for the U.S. and its allies in the region.
However, such sober assessments fail to take into account the unquestioned humanitarian disaster that is taking place in Syria. More than 100,000 documented deaths have been recorded over the course of the current conflict and hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been displaced from their homes. Without external intervention, this humanitarian crisis will likely get worse over time. Template or no template, there are no good choices for U.S. policymakers when it comes to the question of intervention in Syria.
About the Author:
Dr. Yoav Gortzak is Associate Professor of International Relations at American Military University. He specializes in international security issues in general, and in the causes and conduct of violent international conflict in particular.
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