AMU Homeland Security Intelligence Middle East Opinion

UN Security Council Bans Syrian Chemical Weapons

Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security

The legally binding UN Security Council Resolution 2218 could bring about international punitive response measures in the form of military action against Syria if they do not comply with the obligations. Earlier this month, on September 12, Syria made a deposit of the instruments of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and plans to join by October 14, 2013.

UNSC Resolution 2118 is being held as “historic and unprecedented” by a State Department official- the immediate ban on use and eventual destruction of all chemical weapon stock piles by 2014 through a phase-out schedule.

The [understaffed and underfunded] Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will spearhead and monitor the fulfillment of this resolution, taking member state contributions and personnel for the mission- so much hangs on the commitment of the member states.

There is an estimated 1,000 tons of sarin, VX and mustard gas in Syria by intelligence officials.

Other alleged chemical attacks are also being investigated simultaneously.

Obligation, framework and highlights of the resolution:

“Condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law.”

“Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors.”

“Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and decides that all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully in this regard.”

“Encourages Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme, and decides to authorize Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme in the soonest and safest manner.”

“Expresses its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable.”

(i) the chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and quantities thereof;

(ii) the specific type of munitions, sub-munitions and devices in its chemical weapons stockpile, including specific quantities of each type that are filled and unfilled; and

(iii)the location of all of its chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, including mixing and filling facilities and chemical weapons research and development facilities, providing specific geographic coordinates;

(b) not later than 30 days after the adoption of this decision, submit to the Secretariat the declaration required by Article III of the Convention;

Punitive measures for Syrian non-compliance:

For non-compliance the UN Security Council can impose Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits the use of economic sanctions or military force against nations in breach of international law and resolutions. The Council would have to re-adjourn and vote on such actions. What the Resolution 2118 does do is have the Syrian government abandon chemical weapons, their transfer, their use, and destroy them within a bold time-frame.

The US and allies have and should continue to threaten Syria if they do not comply with the above “legal” obligations with unilateral action- meaning that even if a “yes” vote at the UN to implement the use of military force is never accomplished, they will attack anyway within a certain time-frame. The language and message should be clearly laid out- maybe even in secret but right now remains a questionable threat by the US.

Any violations will trigger the International Criminal Court (ICC) probes and prosecutions.

Complications in the midst of the Syrian Civil War. In November, UN inspectors will tour chemical weapons facilities. Some have reported that they may begin as early as Tuesday. Syria has already disclosed some of its weapons and the West will have to verify the list given with their own intelligence services.

Why was Russia blocking measures of potential military force of non-compliance?

At first glance, it seems too easy- the Russians are insincere about diplomacy in general. That is not the case. Syrian President Bashar al Assad could care less about chemical weapons- he needs a cease-fire. The more he uses chemical weapons the more his enemies will use them and the more West will become his enemy. He is willing to give them up and Russia is willing to make sure they do not end up in terrorist hands and are destroyed just as much as the West.

Russia faces the Chechen Islamist separatists- some of which are fighting the jihad with some of the Sunni anti-Assad forces. The issue of blocking the US ‘threat of force’ is not any insincerity toward diplomacy but a matter of power hold issues with what experts have labeled “Russia’s Vietnam.”

Russia knows it does not need to threaten the Assad regime because it is supporting it- Syria’s dependence on Russia and Iran are its life-blood. Without which it dies a horrible and gruesome death at the hands of rebels. Moreover, Russia must “appear” to come to the defense of Syria against a threatening attack from another state- any other state. The fact that the USA is making Russia even more relevant in a little bit of distant defiance does not hurt their egos either or their image of defending their allies.

On the other hand, the Western states have little or no support to Assad and do not and cannot trust him in the least. For the US, the ‘threat of force’ is both a valid insurance for compliance as well as one of preserved credibility. Such threats have been made in the face of humanitarian atrocities by the regime and or the rebels. The West must continue to stand behind its words and principles.

The battle of wording is all over the board. Yesterday (September 27th) the full 15 member UN Security Council came together in unanimous agreement. What should have been addressed was to place a greater responsibility on Russia through the negotiation process. They must also make certain that the weapons are destroyed. True, it would be placing more responsibility on them, but they are already in the best position. They hold the same objective to prevent them from falling in the hands of non-state actors. They would of course not be the sole state responsible, but they would be required to keep Syria in check. The US would also continue to have a real but potentially unspoken threat through military presence in the Mediterranean Sea directed at Syria.

As they passed the draft Resolution Russian Foreign Minister Sergey, “I think we reached an understanding with the U.S.” US Secretary of State John Kerry: “We did reach agreement with respect to the resolution; we’re now doing final work putting that language together.”

But what would Russia do if there is a breach by the Assad regime? Most likely there would be a similar stall tactic in place and a push some limited response. It may be possible to have a limited military strike, but long before that, Russia’s interests are more concerned with taking the chemical weapons off the board entirely as a concession to the West and a tactic of ‘giving a dog a bone.” They are concerned with the spread of the weapons but not so much their use against their enemies. They are more inclined to see them as small scale tragedies of war than their Western counterparts. Depending on the intensity of the next chemical attack, they might be all-aboard with Western sentiments or continue playing it down and shifting the blame to the “rebels.”

If and when the process to eliminate the now banned weapons begins, it will take the form of many ‘rebel’ challenges. These might occur as discriminate targeting of inspectors convoys and or raiding sites, etc.

One important thing to look out for here will be some sort of fraudulent conclusion or blackmail- one group of rebels or the government might make it look as the other side committed the attack or next atrocity. This could continue to be a game of making the other side appear the most evil. The Opposition leadership in Syria is losing all respect from the fighters on the ground, who are now defecting to al Qaeda affiliated groups.

All of this could turn the international community against the increasingly radicalized rebels entirely and maintain Assad in power. Somehow, I think that to be the least likely outcome. His removal or exodus will be required at some stage. A cease-fire will never work because there are too many independent cells and factions. The “holy warriors” will fight there for the next few decades before or if they give up.

Let Russia have a turn, do most the work and spend most the money to hold their territorial possessions- keep them all accountable with a sound state of mind and the larger picture from a distance in view- use some of the other pieces on the board. Already the leadership pieces of the rebels in Turkey have become obsolete points of access and control, making diplomacy and new partnerships possible. Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Israel also remain in peril.

For Full text of Resolution 2118, use address below:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11135.doc.htm

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