By Joseph Bautista
Alumnus, International Relations at American Military University
This article is part one of a two-part series.
Understanding the nature of terrorist groups as social movements is the foundation for defeating them. This understanding will yield critical insights into the workings of such movements and allows strategists and planners to identify those elements of the organization that are vulnerable to attack.
In recent years, there has been an increase in both the number and capability of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones. Originally used for their Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, drones are increasingly being used by the military to eliminate assigned targets.
Drones Attack and Destroy Targets, But Do They Defeat Terrorism?
RPAs conduct the first three phases of what the military calls the F3EA cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyze). U.S. Special Operations Forces are increasingly using drones in counterterrorism campaigns because of their F3EA capability and their ability to remain on station over a target for a relatively long time.
Drones also operate without putting pilots in harm’s way. There is no question of drones’ effectiveness in finding, fixing and finishing their assigned targets. However, are drone strikes really effective in countering terrorism?
Three Essential Elements for Terrorist Organizations’ Success
Before we can answer that question, we have to understand what makes terrorist organizations effective. According to social movement theory, all social movements must have three essential elements to be successful — shared grievances, access to sufficient resources and political opportunities.
Some of the more well-known terrorist leaders and those who have inspired them, such as Sayyid Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have written about the social nature of their groups. The inherently social nature of terrorist organizations allows us to use social movement theory to understand what these groups require to operate.
Shared Grievances Are the Basis of Terrorist Groups’ Cultural Identity
Shared grievances frame the cultural identity of a movement. For Islamic terrorist organizations, these grievances boil down to their perceptions of abuses of power by the West, particularly by the United States, and the West’s interference in Muslim affairs.
In a letter to the American people, Osama bin Laden claimed he never considered attacking the United States until its ally Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Anwar al-Awlaki also wrote of his tolerance of Western religions and how he resented only Western military action in Muslim lands.
The truth of these statements is irrelevant given that this is the message disseminated to the members and potential recruits of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It is how Al-Qaeda’s leadership chose to frame its cultural identity.
Forming Terrorist Movements Requires Access to Resources
Forming a movement requires mobilization of resources. Terrorist organizations require access to material resources such as cash, ammunition and components for explosive devices. Leaders and technical experts are also necessary to amass these physical resources.
Terrorist groups acquire physical resources in four ways: through aggregation, self-production, co-optation and patronage. Leaders and technical experts are required for these methods to be successful.
Beyond the need for physical resources, a charismatic leadership allows a terrorist movement to mobilize a population based on the grievances that frame its identity. Shared grievances on their own cannot give rise to any social movement.
Focusing on Perceived Wrongs Creates Political Opportunities for Terrorists
In the context of terrorism, political opportunities take the form of contentious conditions, safe havens and semi-permissive operating environments. While tied closely to grievances and resources, political opportunities focus on the larger political environment of areas where terrorists operate.
Al-Qaeda has focused on the oppression and disenfranchisement of the faithful to sell them on the idea of fighting against America. While there is contention within Al-Qaeda, there are also some semi-permissive areas where safe havens are established for the planning and rest of terrorists.
Once we understand these requirements for a terrorist organization to exist, we can quantify the effects of RPA strikes on terrorism. An effective counterterrorism campaign has a direct and measurable impact on terrorist organizations.
Determining how best to deal with each of the essential elements of terrorism requires further analysis. However, understanding the nature of terrorist groups as social movements is the foundation to their defeat.
About the Author
Joseph Bautista spent 12 years in the U.S. Air Force, the last six in Air Force Special Operations Command. He worked with Predator and Reaper drones as Mission Operations Commander, Senior Intelligence Duty Officer, and Chief of Plans and Programs. Joseph was also the senior Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Tactical Controller for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Iraq, responsible for tasking and controlling manned and unmanned assets for SOF hunting high-value targets. He recently completed his Master of Arts in International Relations and Conflict Resolution at AMU.
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