Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
They are difficult if not impossible to subdue, even for the world’s most powerful military. Since 2001, the US-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has waged war against the Taliban and other insurgents.
The insurgent’s ability to survive and thrive against the ISAF and Afghanistan security forces is commonly cited due to these factors: they have the home advantage, they are tough and rugged mountain warriors, they see their mission as a holy mission, they employ methods of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, information operations, etc.
All of these factors are important and some more than others. But maybe the most important, is ideological, perceptional and educational in nature. Perhaps, it is not even strictly religious or fundamentalist in nature. Perhaps, their one true advantage is their frame of mind; specifically, the teaching and usage of guile and trickery.
Like many people in the Middle East, they live a life of realism and in many cases a life befitting of the phrase “survival of the fittest.” Life itself must become a strategy. Thinking around the confines of their environment is as natural as breathing air.
They are uneducated by Western standards but they are educated in a strong wisdom tradition that is highly reflective of human nature. Everything from legends, tales and oral myths go even farther back than Islamic introduction. Sure it pays to be tough and keep their faith but their key asset advantage is the primacy of guile and deceit combined with realism and spiritual overtones.
Clearly, the US advantage is not wisdom. The ISAF members place most attention on knowledge, intelligence, databasing and technology. This follows from the traditions of Western Civilization. They have an information and knowledge advantage but not a wisdom advantage.
Central Asia takes after a largely Eastern notion of a strong wisdom tradition which is passed on, apparent through family, tribe and writings. The Koran itself can be seen as a divine factor of this tradition but there are countless others. Many of them use analogies to address themes or convey lessons.
The difference: Western commanders tend to ask, do we have the capabilities to perform ‘x’? Is it the right time to deploy ‘y’?
Taliban insurgents ask things like this: What stings the enemy the most? If we want to defeat the lion, we need a sharper spear; or how to trap an eagle and steal its eggs.
So is the difference in thought a real advantage?
It is possible that Afghan insurgents think more abstractly in general; ironically, more realistically in warfare using this simplistic associative mind-frame. Help from foreign powers like Pakistan and Iran does not hurt them either.
The coalition forces are dependent on linear logical reasoning of: a to b, b to c; therefore c. This is not an operational deficiency so much as a higher political and command planning issue. The US until now, saw the Taliban as a problem needing to be removed and replaced. They were a threat to democracy that was established there. Now, the Taliban must be negotiated with upon exit and they are just as tricky as they were on the battle-field.
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