By William Tucker
The nation of Yemen has seen some rather significant political changes in 2012, but the most prominent is the resignation of long time strong man Ali Abdullah Saleh. Naturally, Saleh hasn’t completely been removed from the scene as he and his tribe still holds significant sway in Yemeni politics. That being said, Saleh’s resignation has largely overshadowed the continuous militant threat the nation faces. As the protests against his rule reached fever pitch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula used the distraction to regroup and has taken the initiative to launch attacks in South Yemen. Indeed, the provinces of Marib and Abyan have faced the bulk of the AQAP offensive. Although AQAP still engages in terrorist attacks in the larger cities to the east, they have shown a remarkable capability to operate both as a light infantry force and a guerrilla militant movement. This is a trend not only seen in Yemen, but one that is exhibited by al-Qaeda affiliates worldwide. Terrorist style violence still has its place for the group; however, a well heeled insurgent approach is proving to be a far superior strategy for the movement.
Yemen has many political issues that are difficult to reconcile, thus allowing AQAP plenty of room to operate with minimal resistance. The U.S. has increased drone operations in the country, but it is of little consequence as AQAP continues to attack military bases successfully. Unless the powers that be in Sana’a can bring the political standoff with both the public and factions within the military to a close, AQAP will continue to operate with little resistance. Perhaps more troubling is the inroads that Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP’s political arm, has made with some tribes in South Yemen. AQAP’s remarkable accomplishments on the military side mean little unless they can curry favor with local tribes and build an effective support base. Without this, AQAP would not be able to operate as it does. Any concerted military offensive against the group must work on the political level as much as it does on the field of combat. Considering the South’s distrust of the power in Sana’a this is likely to be protracted problem. Unfortunately, efforts to curb al-Qaeda involved insurgencies in the Middle East and North Africa are facing similar problems. Al-Qaeda has evolved once again, and it’s time that efforts to fight group evolve as well.
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