By William Tucker
Last year, the Director of National Intelligence conducted a study on the efficiency of the Defense Intelligence Agency and found several areas that were in need of improvement. Unfortunately, the study was classified and the scope of the problems, and the problem areas, are not known in full detail. Press reports have stated that one area for improvement was expanding the scope of the DIA beyond tactical, battlefield intelligence. If this is indeed one of the findings, then the possible future scope of the agency could be quite limitless in the field of intelligence. That being said, the idea behind the new agency, the Defense Clandestine Service, appears to be focused on complimenting existing cooperative operations with the CIA. This is already occurring, and has been since the War on Terror began, but this agency appears to satisfy the desire for a more formal structure for facilitating these joint efforts. Efforts to do this in the past were spearheaded by former Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, but this new approach appears to take a different tact that will likely be more palatable to Congress.
Pentagon officials have stated that the Defense Clandestine Service will take approximately 15% of the field officers out of the DIA initially, and then begin to grow independently to meet the needs of the new agency. It is, after all, a government agency; growth would be a given. Methods of operation are intended to mimic and compliment some of the CIA’s global responsibilities and are expected to operate through U.S. embassies abroad and through existing military attaché and liaison branches across the world. Stepping on the toes of the CIA is certainly a concern, but press reports and government officials discussing the new service haven’t addressed that potential problem. Other issues that might arise will likely include everything from budgetary wrangling to compartmentalizing certain operations where minimalism is required. As the discussion of creating of the Defense Clandestine Service has been in the making for several years, many of these potential issues are likely to have been addressed; however, table top discussions don’t always effectively translate into practical application. Indeed, it will more than likely take time to iron out some of the initial deficiencies. Also, reorganization rarely solves problems; rather it just changes who’s responsible for the problem. The Defense Clandestine Service is unlikely to escape this most basic of problems that are entrenched in Washington. For now, however, we’ll have to watch the Service take shape and offer a more comprehensive analysis in the future.
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