AMU Homeland Security Opinion

Egyptian Civil Strife Not To Be Overshadowed By Syrian Civil War

Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security

Thursday- an assassination attempt against Egyptian Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim. At least on killed and 20 police and civilians were injured. The suspected remote explosive s were potentially planted on a car, the road or even tossed at the convoy. Ibrahim was hurried off the scene. Nine of the other cars in the detail were badly damaged, and a few buildings on the block were defaced.

An official statement responded: “The Cabinet confirms that this criminal offense will not deter the government from facing off terrorism with force and determination, or hitting with an iron fist any hand that jeopardizes the nation’s safety, and that is until stability returns to the corners of our beloved Egypt.”

Pro-Morsi protests Tuesday were largely a response to the trial of the ousted President. As tensions normalized, the curfew was also relaxed. Things were looking a little better and that was not good for the losing the side.

The latest incident was a close call of a VIP that the Brotherhood holds responsible for killing and imprisoning its members. Just when Syria threatened to overshadow Egyptian civil unrest, the latest attack highlights the state on an international scene by Islamic militants. But the reality to the military backed government actions is that by stirring up waters with political Islamists via violent confrontation, imprisonments and trials over the last few months, more terrorists then before have emerged in Egypt. The state is not prepared to handle them all should they turn violent, and appears to be making more enemies than necessary with the political purges of the last two months.

Holding a trial for the deposed President Mohamed Morsi would only be legitimate if it could largely be “perceived” as fair by the people and if the trial excluded capital offences. For example, it would make more popular sense if Morsi faced charges of his political abuses in office, which justified a popular coup, rather than criminal ones. Those charges would all be chronologically laid out and the culmination of rejecting popular will would be the nail in the coffin. A fair sentence could result that keeps him out of office and ineligible at least until the next term or two.

Unfortunately, the deposed Morsi trial is about destroying the political opposition and not justice. He remains in detention, along with the leaders and many members of his political faction. At the same time, Hosni Mubarak might was released to house arrest and undergoing a retrial. That the state media releases of such news alone is a turning back of a secular authoritarian clock. Both are being tried for murders and both are most likely guilty. The real issue will not be the crime or law but the release or pardon of one for the sacrifice of the other in tandem not with the will of the people but that of the old state. Most importantly for the US, neither of them will listen to or accommodate the US national interest. Even the previous player is turning its gaze eastward to more lucrative gains and stronger regional backers.

The remark about defending the army from the Tartars “and” Crusaders implies that internal associative Islamic fundamentalists and external Western state interests. Moreover, the present center of power revolves around General Fatah al-Sisi, who was the head of military intelligence at the time of Mubarak’s decision to kill some 900 peaceful protestors during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. So R.I.P. Here lies the short lived Egyptian Democratic Revolution (2011-2013)? The outcome of progress, at least for the time being is not looking good; and the latest attack will incite an even more aggressive reactivism to military secular nationalism. A total of 600 pro-Morsi protestors have been killed and over 100 security officials.

Expect more terrorists attacks from salafists and civil protests from the Muslim Brotherhood during this transition. Violence will target churches, civilians and the government through Egypt while the Brotherhood will continue to elicit sympathy from international human rights groups, much like the Palestinians. In fact, Staged martyrdom in the streets by the Brotherhood is also not uncommon. The most radical Brotherhood membership has already begun to splinter off and will continue to do so in more violent groups as the military puts greater pressure on them and detains their more moderate centralized leadership. The military will continue to blame the pro-Morsi supporters for all acts of violence and frame them for the direct acts of other groups. The Brotherhood will continue to demonstrate their innocence in long-suffering the political storm and persecution.

In many ways, the Muslim Brotherhood sympathy tactic works well with the most violent radical groups but it is a gamble. Most importantly for them, however, is public and international perception. The military can win and lose at the same time. They might win all the battles and lose the war of hearts and minds in Egypt, as they did during the democratic elections, with secular nationalist Ahmed Shafiq losing 2 percent of the national vote to the Muslim Brotherhood.

If the salafist and other extremist militant groups, including violent splinters from the Brotherhood, manage to destroy key personnel or sectors of Egyptian society, they accomplish a range of favorable objectives: 1) prove the military government weak and incapable of protecting the public, 2) increase membership and rank to militancy, 3) get the military to over-react, 4) become more of an equal opponent for legitimacy in the eyes of certain other players.

The third objective of extreme militant groups matches correlates with the Brotherhood’s play at the sympathy tactic and the fourth will happen if the Brotherhood continues to look weak and make victim-like statements. Even more sympathy would be drawn from their members being attacked on all fronts- the salafist cousins and the military.

If balanced correctly, both moderates and Islamic extremists have the position to take leads. If attacks become out-of-control and many different groups remain uncoordinated and indiscriminately (i.e. more terrorism aimed at civilians) then the opposition movement faces defeat and it loses future public support and sympathy becomes less and less of an option or tactic for the Brotherhood. If not balanced correctly, all sympathy for the Islamists and salafist religious groups is minimized due to the bombing of schools and children, for example, while Hosni Mubarak remains the highest priority symbolic target of assassination, just before the Minister of the Interior.

On the other hand, if the military is successful at shutting down Brotherhood peaceful orchestrated open movements and protests, then the moderates will also virtually disappear to the sound of more violent types.

If the military presses too hard, too fast, as it has been doing, they continue to lose the political legitimacy that they had gained from the public and much of the international community after the soft military/popular coup.

Almost all of this conflict of Egypt’s civil strife is related to the media wars that take place not only on the battlefields but through interpersonal networks and information channels.

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