By Donald Sassano
In Homeland Security Guest Contributor
Hats off to Doug Bandow. Bad me for not discovering his work earlier.
Writing in 2005 concerning the strategic relationship between Australia and the U.S. Bandow proposed the following:
“The greatest challenge facing the two nations is likely to be China. America’s highest priority in the region is likely to become containing Beijing, and particularly defending Taiwan. Confrontation with China is not obviously wise or feasible for America – a better strategy likely would be to accommodate rather than contest the almost inevitable increase in influence of Beijing in a region that is China’s backyard but far distant from the U.S.” (Emphasis mine)
Fast forward roughly a decade and you may be forgiven if you are asking yourself if accommodation is a wise or even a viable strategic option for the U.S in Asia.
China continues to expand economically, albeit at a slower rate. It has a mountain of internal issues to contend with: environmental degradation, endemic corruption, restive minorities, debt, bad demography. Despite its problems (or perhaps because of them) the PRC throws its new found weight around to a degree that all but guarantees to frighten the bejesus out of its neighbors, most of whom are U.S. allies. If a shooting war due to “runaway” Taiwan has receded since Bandow’s analysis, it is only because other intractable territorial disputes, most involving China, have displaced it.
At least for the moment, and in likely response to Chinese provocations, Asia-centric geostrategy has captured the imagination of commentators. Iranian nuclear negotiations, l’affaire Snowden, Af-Pak — stories that dominated media chatter last year are increasingly playing second fiddle. But despite being awash in China analysis, one is hard pressed to identify any foreign policy thinker, and certainly no policy maker, willing to promote the sort of common sense advice similar to that expressed by Bandow in 2005.
Not too surprisingly, the commentariat has coalesced around the idea that the U.S. should lead a balancing coalition to check a dangerous new hegemonic threat. And for many, far more strenuous great power exertions inevitably lie ahead – an air/sea battle here, perhaps a naval blockade there.
But in contrast to all the huffing and puffing, there appears to be little aperception that engaging in a strenuous push back against a nuclear armed peer competitor on the other side of the world, all the while relying on partners who are unable to overcome their own historic enmities, will be a monumental, energy sapping challenge.
Alternately, pursuing some form of modus vivendi – and necessarily defining spheres of interest — just does not appear to be part of today’s lexicon. This is especially so amongst realists who otherwise were opposed to “unwinnable” wars in Vietnam and Iraq, but advocate a tough fisted neo-containment policy vis-à-vis China. To be clear, in the paragraph quoted above Bandow specifically referred to a Chinese “increase in influence”. He was not writing in reference to a rampaging hegemonic wannabe crudely threatening our allies or America’s perch in Asia. Remember, Bandow was writing in 2005.
So how does he feel about America’s Asian future today? In response to my query, Bandow believes a rebalancing of interests and a reduction of U.S. expectations will be necessary, but does not advise abandonment. Rather, the chief aim of American policy should be to shape an environment wherein our allies will not be put in a position of necessarily having to knuckle under to Chinese regional dominance, assuming the latter continues its rise.
He rightly assesses U.S. costs to be far greater than China’s, and their desired outcomes more consequential. I take the latter to mean China will bitterly defend its interests in defiance of what it perceives to be American encirclement, but now it is increasingly in a position to resist a reprise of its “century of humiliation”. It just won’t allow itself to be pushed around any longer.
Concentrating on practical steps devoted to allaying Chinese fears that the U.S. is seeking to sabotage its rise can help prevent a burgeoning security competition from turning the corner to outright hostilities. The Chinese are, after all, realists who pay close attention to power, but also rank and honor. For starters, seeking increased Chinese assistance in order to curb Iran’s enrichment program and the resultant lifting of sanctions will enable it to more confidently source petroleum from its largest Middle East trading partner. Anti-terrorism cooperation, and the continuation of deep bi-lateral economic ties are also appropriate.
But it goes without saying a great deal of flexibility, patience, and strategic forbearance will be necessary should the U.S. decide to take up Bandow’s sage advice. Need I add that such behavior, to put it mildly, has not exactly been our strong suit of late?
About the Author
Donald Sassano is a businessman with strong interests in Middle Eastern politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and political theory. He completed his Master’s Degree in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a concentration in Comparative and Security Issues at American Military University in 2013.
When he’s not reading and writing about foreign affairs, he works at commercial real estate to the extent necessary to keep a roof over his head. He resides with his wife Denise near Lake Erie in Rocky River, Ohio.
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