AMU Homeland Security Intelligence Middle East Opinion

Syrian Rebels Strike Damascus

By William Tucker

To start, it is important to note that the claims by opposition forces and the al-Assad regime concerning the fighting in Damascus cannot be verified; however we cannot ignore that fighting is indeed taking place. That by itself is a significant development in the Syrian saga. In the past few days and weeks, several high level defections have taken place raising the prospect of a ‘palace coup.’ The fighting in Damascus and these defections certainly intersect, but that doesn’t ultimately mean that Assad will fall in the short term. In fact, Assad’s downfall is increasingly becoming realistic, and yet there are a few more areas of the regimes power that we must weaken as well before that occurs.

It is important to dismiss the assertion that the war in Syria is a battle between the regime and the Syrian people. Assad, and his father before him, has held on to power precisely because a large segment of Syria society supports the clan. This goes beyond the Alawite clan, to which the Assad family belongs, and also includes some Sunni, Druze, and Christian elements as well. What this means is despite the killings Assad still has support because people have invested in his rule. As the killing of non-Alawites continues this support from other segments of society may well collapse. This has not happened en mass – yet. The Alawites are a minority in Syria, and therefore, are not willing to give up power easy. Assad may be an Alawite, but he is not necessarily the only Alawite capable of representing the clans hold on Syria.

This leads us to the convergence of the palace coup idea and the FSA attack on Damascus. The FSA, as an insurgency, is smart to hit the capital as Assad has been forced to constantly move his military around the country fighting pockets of resistance. As those military units are kept occupied elsewhere it was natural that the FSA would look to target Damascus hoping for lighter resistance from regime forces. This puts significant pressure on Assad regardless of the prospects of FSA success in their recent offensive. Those closest to Assad may want to strike a deal with the opposition as a way of preserving some semblance of power if they feel sufficiently threatened. That deal could easily include removing Assad as a way to end the violence and maintain some semblance of power for the Alawite clan.

It is only three days into the FSA assault on Damascus, and the situation is still playing out. With the recent defections, and the moxie of the FSA to begin such a heavy task, it is likely that the different players in Syria are beginning to reevaluate their positions and prepare for a post-Assad Syria. As previously stated, there is still a segment of society that supports Assad. As these individuals and clans see the increasing possibility that Assad may not survive they will look to preserve their positions by cutting deals with those likely to hold power after Assad. Naturally, there are a lot of unknowns at this point, but the pressure on Assad is very real. It is coming from opposition forces, but is also increasing among his inner circle – hence the defections. Defections, however, merely serve to save an individual’s person, and do not ensure the survival of a power base. That what this is likely to come down to; the division of power. Increasingly, the key to moving forward in negotiations is the very personal survival of Bashir al-Assad. The prospect for such a survival is quickly reaching its limits.

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