Syria's Search for Strategic Deterrence Could Be Its Downfall

By William Tucker
Contributor, In Homeland Security

In September 2007, four military aircraft targeted and destroyed a nuclear facility deep in the Syrian desert. There was never any doubt as to the raiding party’s identity, but only now has Israel formally acknowledged its role in the so-called “Secret Security Affair.”

International media openly reported the events at the time. However, many details were censored in Israel. The censorship didn’t matter much, because numerous Israeli media outlets ran stories on intelligence operations that were part of the overall raid.

Those stories included the hack of a Syrian government official’s computer while he was visiting the U.K. and the mysterious death of the Syrian general who headed the short-lived nuclear program. Furthermore, the George W. Bush administration briefed Congress on the raid and made public some of the pertinent U.S. intelligence.

In the context of the Syrian civil war, it would seem that this bit of history is irrelevant and not worth mentioning. But the rationale behind the Syrian nuclear pursuit and the Israeli raid is still prescient. Israel’s decision to disclose the details of the operation now is not without good reason.

Major Powers Vying for Control of Middle East

The Syrian civil war has taken on a new dynamic in which major powers are vying for lasting influence. Currently, Iran has the stronger hand in Syria, while Russia and the U.S. have the more capable military forces.

The Assad regime has survived so far, even if it is under more foreign control than in years past. As a result, the Israeli-Syrian détente that existed before the civil war began seven years ago is no longer reliable. The large Iranian military presence in Syria, along with the recent Turkish invasion, has profoundly changed the situation.

Returning to a Geopolitical Reality

Maintaining a military presence far from home is an expensive venture for Iran, which will eventually feel the fiscal strain. Turkey, situated much closer to Syria, is in a better situation.

Assad’s allies are not exactly the most economically sound partners and their protection is not guaranteed in the long term. With Assad unable to control the whims of these foreign forces in his country, there is a strong possibility that their geopolitical pursuits will not always mesh perfectly with the power goals of Damascus.

Syria must prepare to rebuild the nation. Assad must secure some form of strategic deterrent to the omnipresent threats next door.

It is a poorly kept secret that Israel is a member of the nuclear club. But the ambiguity of the nuclear program allows Israel’s Arab neighbors to feign indifference and abstain from following along in the nuclear pursuit.

That strategic outlook has changed recently; Saudi Arabia is looking to pursue a nuclear program to counter Iran. But Syria has fewer options since its last drive toward a nuclear program ended so disastrously in 2007.

Syria Still Creating a Viable Chemical Weapons Program

Syria once had a weapons program that was the most sophisticated in the Middle East – its chemical weapons. When Assad began using chemical weapons against his population in December 2012, Russia and the U.S. brokered an agreement to dismantle the stockpile within months.

Not surprisingly, Syria did not declare its entire stockpile destroyed and continued to use these weapons. A recent UN report suggests that Syria not only maintained a stockpile of chemical weapons, but has also worked with North Korea to rebuild the entire program.

Syria Cannot Handle a Two-Front War

Syria’s strategic picture was dubious before the civil war. Aleppo is closer to Turkey than it is to Damascus and the Israeli border is a mere 40 miles from the Syrian capital. Syria would be extremely hard-pressed to defend its northern and southern borders simultaneously.

With this inability to cope with a two-front war in mind, it is no surprise that Syria would pursue some form of strategic deterrent. Syria’s drive to maintain a chemical weapons capability is not aimed at the futile search of parity with Israel. Instead, it is a realization that Syria simply lacks any meaningful military options.

The presence of so many foreign military forces on its soil further compounds the situation. In addition, Syria’s national security problem will not disappear once the bulk of these foreign troops leave.

Syria is in an impossible quandary. The geopolitical situation that existed before the civil war has not changed; instead, it has only become more acute.

Unfortunately for Syria, the race to rebuild its chemical weapons capabilities will not resolve this situation, nor improve its strategic picture with its neighbors. The very capability that Damascus is pursuing as a deterrent to war may prove to be Syria’s undoing.