By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
After a long begrudging reluctance to even consider thinking about the possibility of new warfare with Russia, Western states have slowly taken some placating military steps to prepare for more aggression, but a worst case scenario is still within the realm of possibilities—and this scenario has not been taken very seriously by political leaders and seldom publicly mentioned by military leaders with much gravitas.
However, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that Russian President Vladimir Putin might attempt to seize NATO territory. “The threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being,” General Bradshaw stated.
The U.K.’s Defense Secretary Michael Fallon warned of a “real and present danger” to destabilize the Baltic states coming out of the Kremlin. Destabilizing might also include using paramilitary forces, sedition, subversion, espionage and economic warfare—all done in Crimea before annexation and now in southeast Ukraine. Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw was very clear on the point that Moscow might also deploy conventional military forces as well. Russia returned diplomatic fire by stating Defense Secretary Fallon’s comments were “absolutely unacceptable.”
Remarks similar to Fallon’s and Bradshaw’s are picking up steam. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called Russian actions “craven,” as the U.S. works with European allies to raise new sanctions on Russia.
Over the course of the last several months, NATO has pledged solidarity with its Baltic state partners with visits that stress any attack on the Baltics is an attack on NATO. The U.S. is planning on sending a brigade of armor to the Baltic states as a follow-up of training their forces in Operation Atlantic Resolve.
Nevertheless, NATO remains indecisive through a massive internal debate and division among its representatives. This internal disunity adds increasing uncertainty.
Sanctions and ‘Volunteers’
Meanwhile, Moscow continues to act more belligerent in Eastern Ukraine and its threatening elsewhere. Since the beginning, they have stated that Russian military “volunteers” might be entering Ukraine and they have maintained that there are no Russian troops in Ukraine, which is a probable smokescreen to their dirty paramilitary operations in Donetsk, Luhanks and Novoazovsk.
But the more the West squeezes Moscow with economic sanctions for military involvement in Ukraine, the more Moscow lashes out with greater military threats. The lever has never been one of military-to-military dimension.
Putin told the world, “No one should have any illusions that it’s possible to achieve military superiority over Russia or apply any kind of pressure on it” and promised an “adequate response.” What Putin means is that he desires a military superiority above all else and promises a counterstrike for every Western move that damages his state, no matter what form it takes. Putin will attempt to take back what he can from the West. In Putin’s mind, he is simply retrieving due compensation for national losses taken by the ultranationalist Ukrainian authorities and/or as a result of Western actions.
Unfortunately, the Western leadership failed to take this into account in spite of multiple warnings and analyses. They are about to unleash even more sanctions because of the fall-between Kiev and the pro-Russian separatists after another botched cease-fire agreement last week.
Because NATO forces are unfortunately not in a position to contain Russia, the diplomatic strategy has been highly uncoordinated with military strategy and necessary asset posture. For this reason, and because of a deeply felt national loss of territory by NATO over the last decades, the fall from historic-era levels of respect and the domestic propaganda, the Kremlin is on a mission to gain something—anything for a little moment—even if it loses everything.
Putin has decorated himself in the national cause of a Russian theme of strength and vengeance against Western abuses. His domestic need for a foreign victory outweighs his need for any foreign losses, even if that means eventual war. However, the war will likely be limited to small state theaters like the Baltics.
Even if everything dies down in Ukraine and the matter gets resolved through decentralizing some power, Putin’s unconventional war will not be finished. Even as Putin celebrates Russia’s war, aging veterans in a somber atmosphere and says that a war with Ukraine is “unlikely,” this only emphasizes his long-held position that he wishes to avoid deploying conventional forces. This is seen empirically through his incremental “volunteers” whom no authorities in Russia apparently stop and in fact openly encourage it. Putin is seemingly playacting to a Russian and Western audience when he says he is hopeful of a peaceful resolution with Ukraine.
On the other side, the Western strategy of a ‘slow bleed’ economics through sanctions was a bold and intelligent piece of statecraft. However, the total neglect and disregard for any military readiness was extremely ill-advised. Diplomatic tactics failed miserably because they had no immediate teeth either but also because the West had made a gain and Russia a loss with Ukraine. Economic and political sanctions take time to grind away Russia. But letting Russia destroy itself, again, is a policy of naiveté in that as it erodes, it will become more desperate, be more unpredictable and increases subtle territorial expansion in Putin’s Near Abroad strategy.
NATO has reluctantly refrained from any military buildup, even if such measures are justified by a Russian military buildup on the opposite side of the border. If it incrementally does this, Russia could invade and their supply lines are closer. They would be able to hold the territory. Russia has the military advantage, and the frustration is that it may not be possible for other states to regain the military advantage without causing or triggering an attack. The outcome has been a Baltic strategy of ‘fall back and hold’ in which case the Baltic states prepping for a possible conventional assault that will delay a potential Russian advance for NATO deployment on their soil. That is a pretty strong deterrent, but it will not work against the unconventional subversive measures at Moscow’s disposal.
Options for the West
The first option the West might employ is to take an ‘all in’ approach and wipe any trace of Russia from continental Europe. This means ousting every trace of Russia’s state enterprise: diplomatically, economically and militarily. That is an extremely hard choice to ponder.
The second option is to be prepared to give Russia some political concessions and restore ties and relations regardless of their actions or intent. This means sacrificing eastern Ukraine and Crimea while avoiding a larger and more destructive campaign in the future. It means splitting Ukraine again as the dividing line between them. However, sentiments have soured beyond complete mistrust and into the accelerating separation of two highly divergent civilizations: European and Russian. Will this really appease Russia? Not in the long term. Also, the window of opportunity is running out (if not already lost) for option two.
Any hybrid strategy or increase of past measures is bound to lack enough strength to challenge a determined Russia and will end up escalating the West-Russia conflict even more. Then there is the desire to punish Russian aggression and provocation that goes beyond the acceptable norms of Europe. Other options: ignoring the Kremlin has failed and will continual to fail with the Russian state of mind.
So it is likely to come to a form of limited or restricted war if only because the two mind frames continue to confuse, anger and misread the other’s purpose and intentions. Neither side acknowledges any wrongdoing in Ukraine. Both sides feel under attack. Both sides feel they are on the defensive (Russia sees an encroaching NATO over the last few decades and NATO sees the recent expansionist aims since Georgia 2008). Neither side is willing or capable of seeing the other side’s perspective. Each side has complex narratives as to the just cause of the conflicts, the villains, the defensive actions of their leaders and the grand visions of only one peaceful outcome: their own. Ultimately, neither side appears willing to abandon their objective.
Note: The opinions and comments stated in the preceding article, and views expressed by any contributor to In Homeland Security, do not represent the views of American Military University, American Public University System, its management or employees.
